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Advanced Measurement Initiative - program launched by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
to accelerate the adoption and application of remote sensing and other technologies for envi-
ronmental monitoring and protection purposes.
Airborne Visible and Infra-Red Imaging Spectrometer - aerial hyperspectral sensor developed by
the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
Canadian Space Agency - the organization in charge of Canadian space programs. 
U.S. Department of Defense.
Earth Observation Satellite Company - a joint venture of RCA Corporation and Hughes Aircraft
Company.  It was selected by National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration of the U.S.
Department of Commerce to take over the Landsat program in 1985.  Space Imaging acquired
EOSAT in November 1996.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
European Space Agency - the body in charge of space exploration and development of new tech-
nologies for fourteen Western European countries.
Geographic Information System.
Hyperspectral - electro-optical sensor capable of distinguishing fine shades of different colors and
thereby providing information on the chemical composition of objects on the ground.
Indian Remote Sensing satellite.
Low Earth Orbit - circular orbits typically between 100 and 1,000 kilometers above ground. These
orbits are ideal for high-resolution commercial and military remote sensing systems because they
lessen the technical demands placed on the satellite sensors.
MacDonald Dettwiler and Associates - a subsidiary of the U.S. company Orbital Sciences, which
was originally selected by the Canadian Space Agency to develop and operate the RADARSAT-2
satellite and market all the resulting data.
Multispectral - electro-optical sensor capable of producing color imagery.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration - the U.S. agency in charge of research and devel-
opment relating to space.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration - the branch of the U.S. Department of
Commerce presently in charge of licensing and regulating the commercial remote sensing 
industry.
Panchromatic - electro-optical sensors capable of producing only black-and-white imagery.
Return Beam Vidicom - similar to a television camera.
Research and Development Laboratories - this company is currently developing the RADAR-1 com-
mercial satellite.
Surface-to-air missile.
Synthetic Aperture Radar - radar sensor capable of collecting imagery at night and in poor weath-
er conditions.
Satellite Pour l'Observation de la Terre - although developed and operated by the French Space
Agency (CNES), Spot Image manages the SPOT systems on a commercial basis.
Surface-to-surface missile.
Space Technology Development Corporation - the U.S. Office of Naval Research is subsidizing STDC
in the amount of $60 million to develop and deploy the Naval EarthMap Observer (NEMO) satel-
lite.
Texaco Energy and Environmental Multispectral Imaging Spectrometer - hyperspectral sensor
developed by Texaco for fracture analysis and environmental protection purposes.
United Nations.
United States Geological Survey - the branch of the U.S. Department of the Interior presently in
charge of Landsat 7 operations and data distribution.
West Indian Space Ltd. - a U.S.-Israeli joint venture comprised of the Israel Aircraft Industries
Ltd. of Lod, Israel; El-Op Electro-Optics Industries of Rehovot, Israel; and Core Software
Technology Inc. of Pasadena, California.
AMI   
AVIRIS
CSA
DOD
EOSAT
EPA
ESA
GIS
HS
IRS
LEO
MDA
MS
NASA
NATO
NOAA
PC
RBV
RDL
SAM
SAR
SPOT
SSM
STDC
TEEMS
UN
USGS
WIS
acronyms and abbreviations
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vWe are living in a world of fundamental change. Transformations are under way in
the meaning and the relevance of national borders; in the relationship of governments
to one another; in the roles of other entities, private business and nongovernmental
organizations that are capable of governance; and in the meaning of national sover-
eignty. One of the driving forces behind these changes is the information revolution, by
means of which huge masses of information now flow widely around the world.
Another is the growing acceptance of transparency, which has led some governments
to relax long-held political restrictions on the gathering and dissemination of infor-
mation. These two trends come together in the subject of this monograph: the advent
and the likely impact of commercial high-resolution imaging satellites.
As the monograph makes clear, these satellites promise a quantum leap in the
ongoing information revolution. Although satellites have been observing the Earth
for nearly forty years, those that could provide highly detailed imagery were oper-
ated by secret military/intelligence programs. Governments made some satellite
imagery available for sale beginning in 1972, but that imagery showed broad
panoramas, not fine detail. Recently, however, governments and commercial firms
have begun to sell imagery that discerns objects as small as 1 meter across.
Public availability of timely high-resolution imagery represents a notable break with
the past. We are moving from an era in which only a handful of governments had
access to high-resolution imagery to one in which every governmentÑand businesses,
nongovernmental organizations, and terrorist and criminal groupsÑwill have such
access. Nonstate actors will be able to peer behind the walls of national sovereignty,
accelerating a shift in power that is already under way.
Yet governments throughout the world are woefully unprepared for the coming era of
global transparency. Most countries have chosen to ignore these recent developments.
Others have devised flawed policies that will prove unworkable in the long term.
To spur a debate on the possibilities and consequences of this technology, in May 1999,
the Carnegie Endowment’s Project on Transparency sponsored a conference that
brought together a range of specialists, policy makers, journalists, and diplomats from a
score of countries. The conference looked both at the implications for specific sectors,
such as national security, environment, the media, and humanitarian assistance, and at
the broad effects on governance and global politics. This monograph draws from and
goes beyond those discussions, providing a breadth of scope and a level of detail beyond
what could be covered in a one-day conference.
This is a timely and badly needed analysis of the remote sensing industry while
it is still in its infancy. Satellite imagery is a crucial component of an ongoing shift
toward greater transparency. Mishandling the technologies and the policies that
make such transparency possible would impose heavy costs in missed opportuni-
ties and potential threats. But if handled right, the new transparency could offer
enormous benefits for nations and peoples around the world.
The Carnegie Endowment is grateful to the Rockefeller Brothers Fund for its support.
Jessica Tuchman Mathews, PresidentÑ
Carnegie Endowment for International PeaceÑ
foreword
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Each chapter opens with satellite images provided by Space Imaging. The two
images on the left show lower Manhattan, and the three on the right are of Ronald
Reagan National Airport in Washington, D.C. 
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By the year 2003 at least eleven private
companies from five different countries
expect to have high-resolution commer-
cial remote sensing satellites in orbit.
These new satellites have capabilities
approaching those of military spy satel-
lites, but with one key difference: their
images will generally be available to
anyone able to pay for them. This new
technology raises a host of policy con-
cerns with which governments, busi-
ness executives, and analysts around
the world are just beginning to grapple.
This monograph, inspired by the dis-
cussions at a recent conference of the
Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, addresses those policy concerns1.
Key conclusions are that:
n Increased access to high-resolution
satellite imagery will shift power
from the former holders of secrets to
the newly informed. Governments
that previously had limited or no
access to satellite imagery can for the
first time see what elite states have
observed from the skies for many
years. In addition, commercial satel-
lite imagery will provide an indepen-
dent source of information to groups
in civil society. Both state and non-
state actors will employ satellite
imagery to monitor and sometimes
publicize the activities of various
countries and corporations. 
n High-resolution satellite imagery
has both beneficial and malign
applications. It can significantly
enhance the ability of governmen-
tal and nongovernmental organiza-
tions to respond quickly to sudden
humanitarian emergencies such as
in Somalia and Iraq, document and
publicize large-scale humanitarian
atrocities such as those witnessed
in Kosovo and Rwanda, help con-
trol environmental problems rang-
ing from impending droughts to
deforestation, monitor compliance
with international agreements, and
assist in managing international
disputes before they escalate to
full-scale interstate wars. But abun-
dance of information does not
guarantee benevolent uses. State
and nonstate actors could employ
remote sensing imagery to conduct
industrial espionage, collect intelli-
gence, plan terrorist attacks, or
mount offensive military opera-
tions. 
n Attempts to control access to high-
resolution satellite imagery are
bound to fail. Since the end of the
cold war, technological progress, cou-
pled with a greater appreciation for
the military, civilian, and commercial
utility of high-resolution satellite
data, has persuaded governments
and corporations in virtually every
region of the world to invest in
indigenous remote sensing indus-
tries. As a result, both the satellite
technology and the necessary support
infrastructure have become global. It
is unlikely that any one country,
regardless of its size or market share,
executive summary
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can by itself curb access to high-reso-
lution satellite imagery. And because
of the large number and varied political
agendas of the countries that will
operate various satellites (Canada,
France, India, Israel, Russia, the
United States, and possibly China),
multilateral agreements on control
seem elusive. Governments need to
accept this new era of mutual assured
observation, take advantage of its
positive effects, and find ways to
manage its negative consequences.
n Commercially available high-reso-
lution satellite imagery will trigger
the development of more robust
denial and deception and antisatel-
lite countermeasures. Widely
available high-resolution satellite
imagery will undoubtedly compel
governments to develop effective
means for keeping their secrets hid-
den. Many states, especially those
with regional adversaries, will invest
heavily in denial and deception and
antisatellite countermeasures. Such a
development could have serious
implications for confidence-building
and crisis management among
mutually vulnerable states.
n Expected gains from commercial
high-resolution satellite imagery
may be exaggerated. Satellite imagery
is only one source of data among
many. While it can detect large-scale
troop movements, mass graves, and
deforestation, it cannot reveal what
those troopsÕ intentions are, who is
buried in the mass graves, or how
deforestation can be stopped.
Complementary data are necessary to
turn satellite imagery into usable
information.
n Good training for imagery analysts
is essential. Satellite imagery can be
difficult to interpret. It takes years
before an analyst gains the experi-
ence and expertise necessary to be
able to derive useful information
from gigabytes of transmitted data.
Junior analysts are wrong far more
often than they are right. It is essen-
tial that imagery analysts go through
extensive training not only at the
beginning of their careers, but also
every time they shift the focus of
their workÑanalysts who specialize
in interpreting and analyzing the
activities of ground forces cannot
overnight become experts on nuclear
testing or environmental issues. 
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1Over the next five years, at least five
private companies around the world
plan to launch commercial remote
sensing satellites able to detect objects
as small as one meter across. That
level of detail is not as good as that of
current government-controlled spy
satellites, which by most accounts can
achieve a resolution of just a few cen-
timeters, but it is getting close. One
key difference renders the commercial
satellites far more interesting and pos-
sibly far more destabilizing than the
state-owned spy satellites: the opera-
tors of these systems are not going to
hide the imagery in the bowels of
intelligence agencies, but are going to
sell it to anyone able and willing to
pay. The new commercial satellites
will make it possible for the buyers of
satellite imagery to, among other
things, tell the difference between
trucks and tanks, expose movements
of large groups such as troops or
refugees, and determine the probable
location of natural resources. 
Whether this increased access to
imagery amounts to a positive or nega-
tive development depends on who
chooses to use it and how. On the plus
side, governments, international orga-
nizations, and nongovernmental
groups may find it easier to respond
quickly to sudden movements of
refugees, document and publicize large-
scale humanitarian atrocities, monitor
environmental degradation, or manage
international disputes before they esca-
late to full-scale interstate wars. The
United Nations, for example, is looking
into the possibility that satellite imagery
could significantly help curtail drug
trafficking and narcotics production
over the next ten years. Similarly, the
International Atomic Energy Agency is
studying the utility of commercial high-
resolution satellite imagery for monitor-
ing state compliance with international
arms control agreements. 
But there is no way to guarantee
benevolent uses. Governments, corpo-
rations, and even small groups of indi-
viduals could use commercial satellite
imagery to collect intelligence, conduct
industrial espionage, plan terrorist
attacks, or mount offensive military
operations. Even when intentions are
good, it can be remarkably difficult to
derive accurate and useful information
from the heaps of transmitted data. The
media, for one, have already made
major mistakes, misinterpreting images
and misidentifying objects, including
the number of reactors on fire during
the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986
and the location of the Indian nuclear
test sites just last year.
Such bloopers notwithstanding, the
new satellite imagery will provide
many people with information to
which they never before had access.
The implications for national sover-
eignty, international peace and security,
the ability of corporations to keep pro-
prietary information secret, and the
balance of power among the former
holders of information (a few industri-
alized states) and the newly informed
introduction1
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(other governments and global civil
society) are serious. Undoubtedly
states will attempt to maintain tight
controls over this new source of infor-
mation. Whether their efforts will suc-
ceed remains to be seen.
In short, the new form of transparency
brought about by the advent of high-res-
olution commercial satellites raises a host
of pressing questions. Does it portend an
age of peace and stability, or does it create
vulnerabilities that will make the world
more unstable and violent? What contri-
butions can emerging remote-sensing
technologies make to the fields of news
reporting, humanitarian relief, environ-
mental protection, and international
security? What policies could the United
States and other countries adopt to secure
the benefits of growing international
transparency while limiting its potential
negative consequences?
In addressing these questions, this
monograph builds on discussions at a
May 1999 conference of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace
entitled No More Secrets? Policy
Implications of Commercial Remote
Sensing Satellites. Chapter 2 describes
the range of security, environmental,
and humanitarian uses of satellite
imagery. Chapter 3 traces the emer-
gence of what has now become a truly
global satellite remote sensing industry.
Chapter 4 explores the drawbacks to
unfettered access to satellite imagery,
and shows why satellite imagery by
itself will not uncover all secrets.
Chapter 5 tackles the pressing policy
questions raised by the advent of pow-
erful private remote sensing systems.
The report concludes by considering
the larger context and broad implica-
tions of the emerging era of global
transparency.
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An analysis of the implications of the new satellites requires a basic understanding of what
the various existing and future systems can see and do, what the jargon used in the remote
sensing field means, and what types of sensors exist.1
Perhaps the best-known concept is that of spatial resolution. Spatial resolution refers to the
size of the objects on the ground that the satellite sensor is able to detect. A satellite image
is a mosaic. A sensor applies one value (a shade of gray or color) to each square of the mosa-
ic. For a satellite with 1-meter resolution, each square in the mosaic corresponds to one
square meter of ground area, while 10-meter resolution corresponds to ten square meters on
the groundÑa difference of a factor of 100 (see image on page 26).
At present, civilian and commercial satellites carry one of three types of sensors: film, elec-
tro-optical, and synthetic aperture radar (SAR).2
n Film sensors take actual photographs, with the film returned to Earth either by retrieving
ejected film capsules or by recovering the entire satellite. Both U.S. and Soviet spy satel-
lites started off using film, and many Russian satellites still do. Film provides good high-
resolution imagery but has two real drawbacks. It can be slow, since it usually has to be
physically retrieved and developed, and the satellite becomes useless once it runs out of
film, a characteristic that requires frequent launches of new satellites.
n Electro-optical sensors overcome these disadvantages. They measure the electromagnetic
radiation reflected off or emitted by objects on the EarthÕs surface, creating digital images
of ground features that are then transmitted to receiving stations on Earth in a matter of
minutes. However, these systems, like film, do not produce their own signals and therefore
depend on other sources of energy such as the sun to illuminate the objects being observed.
This characteristic constrains the use of both types of systems to daylight hours and favor-
able conditions. Bad weather or smoke can severely limit what these systems can see.3
There are three different types of electro-optical sensors. Panchromatic sensors detect energy
reflectance in only one band of the electromagnetic spectrum and thus produce black-and-
white imagery. Multispectral sensors can measure electromagnetic reflectance in several dif-
ferent color bandsÑusually three to seven4Ñand so produce color images. Hyperspectral sen-
sors, through a similar technique, image objects using many different spectral bands. The abil-
ity of hyperspectral sensors to distinguish tens and sometimes hundreds of different shades of
color allows them to provide a great deal of information about the composition of features on
the EarthÕs surface not discernible by either panchromatic or multispectral instruments.
n With synthetic aperture radar sensors, the systems transmit a signal in the microwave
part of the spectrum to the EarthÕs surface and then detect the characteristics of the return
signal after it reflects off objects on the surface. Because radar satellites emit their own sig-
nals and operate in longer wavelengths than electro-optical systems, their operations are
not limited to daylight hours. Synthetic aperture radar sensors can image any spot on
Earth day or night, in any weather, through clouds and smoke. As with the electro-opti-
cal systems, they produce digital data that can be downloaded to ground receiving sta-
tions moments after the images are collected.
1For an overview of existing and emerging remote sensing systems, visit the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace website at www.ceip.org/programs/transparency/RemoteSensingConf/GuptaPage.htm.
2The definition of spatial resolution applies to electro-optical and radar systems. Film is different.
3The exception is infrared sensors, which detect the thermal infrared radiation emitted by warm objects.
4At least three bands - red, green, and blue - are necessary to produce color imagery.
the technology of remote sensing
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4In 1858 the French photographer
Gaspard-Felix Tournachon (popularly
known as Nadar) pioneered the field of
remote sensing when he took the worldÕs
first aerial photograph of Paris from his
gas balloon, Le Gant, 250 feet above the
ground. Two years later Nadar found
himself taking aerial pictures of enemy
troop movements during the 1870 Franco-
Prussian war.2 What had started as one
manÕs desire to capture the imagination of
the world through the lens of a camera
suddenly found novel applications in the
bloody field of interstate warfare.
Since those early days, many more
applications have been discovered for
remote sensing data. Although the age
of easy access to timely high-resolution
satellite imagery is just now dawning,
for several decades imagery has been
available from aircraft and even (at
lower resolutions) from government-
operated satellites (see Chapter Three
and Appendix B). Over the past thirty
years, governments, corporations, and
nongovernmental organizations have
used aerial and space-based imagery
platforms to, among other things, col-
lect intelligence, execute military oper-
ations, plan development projects, and
monitor the environment. It seems like-
ly that as the availability of high-reso-
lution imagery grows, and especially if
the prices drop, governments and non-
state actors will find new arenas where
remote sensing data can be of value. 
Although a discussion of the full
range of applications for remote sens-
ing data is beyond the scope of this
monograph, the brief overview that fol-
lows provides a glimpse of the multi-
faceted significance of this powerful
form of global transparency.
security applications
Of all the applications of commercial
high-resolution satellite imagery, the
most controversial and the most lucrative
are its security applications.3 In the short
term, nearly half the sales of high-resolu-
tion imagery will be made to defense and
intelligence organizations worldwide. 
High-resolution commercial satellite
imagery can help governments, espe-
cially those with no indigenous
imagery collection capabilities, monitor
the activities of neighbors and regional
adversaries and expose violations of
international norms and treaties (see
Table 1). In August 1987, for example,
the German foreign intelligence service,
the Bundesnachrichten Dienst, used
10-meter resolution SPOT imagery to
publicize the construction of a chemical
warfare production facility near Rabta,
Libya.4 Space-based reconnaissance is
particularly well suited for this type of
intelligence collection because it is
sanctioned under international law and
is considerably less intrusive than
either aerial or on-ground surveillance.
An added advantage of commercial
satellite imagery is that it can be shared.
Whereas government officials closely
guard spy satellite images to conceal
the technical capabilities of national
reconnaissance systems, commercial
imagery can easily be shared with for-
applications of emerging
remote sensing capabilities 2
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troop units
vehicles
aircraft
airfield facilities
nuclear weapons
components
missile sites (SSM/SAM)
rockets and artillery
surface ships
surfaced submarines
roads
bridges
communications
   radar
   radio
command and control
headquarters
supply dumps
land minefields
urban areas
coasts, landing beaches
ports and harbors
railroad yards and shops
terrain
6.0
1.5
4.5
6.0
2.5
3.0
1.0
7.5-15.0
7.5-30.0
6.0-9.0
6.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
1.5-3.0
3.0-9.0
60.0
15.0-30.0
30.0
15.0-30.0
--
2.0
0.6
1.5
4.5
1.5
1.5
0.6
4.5
4.5-6.0
6.0
4.5
1.0
1.5
1.5
0.6
6.0
30.0
4.5
15.0
15.0
90.0
1.20
0.30
1.00
3.00
0.30
0.60
0.15
0.60
1.50
1.80
1.50
0.30
0.30
1.00
0.30
1.00
3.00
3.00
6.00
6.00
4.50
0.30
0.06
0.15
0.30
0.03
0.30
0.05
0.30
1.00
0.60
1.00
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.03
0.03
3.00
1.50
3.00
1.50
1.50
0.150
0.045
0.045
0.150
0.015
0.045
0.045
0.045
0.030
0.400
0.300
0.015
0.015
0.090
0.030
--
0.750
0.150
0.300
0.400
0.750
Detectionb General IDc
Precise
IDd Description
e Technical
AnalysisfTarget
a
Approximate Ground Resolution in Meters for Target
Detection, Identification, Description, and Analysis
table 1
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eign governments and international
organizations, a considerable advan-
tage in multilateral operations such as
those in Iraq, Bosnia, or Kosovo.
In addition to intelligence collection,
high-resolution commercial satellite
imagery can help identify enemy vul-
nerabilities, plan military operations,
assess strike effectiveness, and prioritize
targets for follow-up missions. There is
some evidence that the Iraqi military
may have used 10-meter resolution
SPOT satellite photographs for attack
planning and post-attack assessments
both during the eight-year Iran-Iraq war
and prior to the invasion of Kuwait in
August 1990.5 SPOT and Landsat
imagery later helped the allied forces
expel the Iraqi troops from Kuwait.6
Technological advances are likely to
increase the demand for commercial
satellite imagery. With the launch of the
worldÕs first hyperspectral sensors on
board the OrbView 4, Naval EarthMap
Observer, and Aries satellites, all of
which are scheduled to begin opera-
tions within the next three years, secu-
rity agencies worldwide will have
access to richer data for intelligence
gathering and military planning.
Hyperspectral imagery can detect any
type of camouflage that is not natural
and growing. Green plastic and foliage
have unique spectral signatures that
are easily distinguishable from living
vegetation. Military planners can use
such information to design and carry
out precision strikes against concealed
high-value targets. In addition, hyper-
spectral sensors may be able to identify
high concentrations of different chemi-
cals in the soil.7 It may be possible to
employ these sensors to monitor, docu-
ment, and publicize the production and
use of chemical weapons in different
parts of the world.
There is no reason to believe that the
demand for commercial satellite
imagery for intelligence collection and
military planning will abate any time in
the near future. As long as armed con-
flicts occur, government demand for
Bomb damage 
assessment photos
released by the U.S.
Department
of Defense on
December 17, 1998, 
of the Baghdad
Directorate of 
Military Intelligence
Headquarters.
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remote sensing data is likely to remain
high, regardless of what happens to the
prices of satellite imagery. If anything,
with the launch of new systems with
better spatial and spectral resolutions
and shorter turnaround times, demand
will continue to grow.
humanitarian applications
On August 10, 1995, Madeleine K.
Albright, at the time the United StatesÕ
chief delegate to the United Nations,
called the attention of the international
community to atrocities committed by
Bosnian Serbs against Bosnian Muslims
after the fall of the UN Òsafe areaÓ in
Srebrenica.8 Amb. Albright presented
the UN Security Council with American
spy satellite images that showed people
herded into a soccer field at Nova
Kasaba the previous July 13 and 14.
Imagery collected several days later
revealed an empty stadium but mounds
of freshly dug earth in the nearby field
(see top of page 8). After the end of hos-
tilities, war crimes investigators
exhumed the graves and recovered the
bodies of dozens of Bosnian Muslims9.
The 1995 incident unveiled to the
world the power of satellite imagery in
monitoring, documenting, and, possi-
bly, deterring large-scale humanitarian
crises. On April 1, 1999, as a new chap-
ter of Serbian aggression was being
written, this time against Kosovar
Albanians, members of ten human
rights and religious organizations gath-
ered at the National Press Club in
Washington, D.C., to call upon the
Clinton administration to Òimmediate-
ly provide the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
with all available intelligence informa-
tion that reveals evidence of atrocities
in Kosovo, specifically imagery collect-
ed by satellites, aircraft, and unmanned
air vehicles.Ó10 Responding to such
demands, the United States and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) released numerous satellite
images of mass graves in different parts
of Kosovo, including Glodane, Velika
Krusa, Pusto Selo, Glogovac, and Izbica
(see bottom of page 8).
The flood of spy satellite imagery
made available to the public during the
Kosovo crisis was unprecedented. It is
not clear, however, whether the United
States and its NATO allies will be so
open again. Publicizing the egregious
acts of the Serbian forces in Kosovo
clearly served the political objectives of
the Clinton administration, which was
trying to win the support of the inter-
national community in general and the
American public in particular. It seems
doubtful that a future U.S. administra-
tion would be as forthcoming if releas-
ing spy satellite imagery meant having
to take action against states with close
ties to the United States or having to
consider undertaking a major engage-
ment in less strategically significant
parts of the world, such as Rwanda,
Sudan, or Afghanistan.
The advent of commercial high-reso-
lution satellites will guarantee that in
the future the Milosovics of the world
will not be able to carry out their sinis-
ter plans unobserved. Satellites can
document events in the remotest cor-
ners of the world, or in areas where
security concerns limit access to inter-
national observers and media groups.
Such information can later be used to
publicize humanitarian emergencies
and possibly punish the perpetrators of
humanitarian crimes. Commercial
satellite operators are generally not
restrained by the sort of political con-
straints that often muzzle the response
of state governments. Whereas states
may refrain from publicizing acts of
humanitarian violence in other friendly
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United States 
surveillance photograph
in a handout presented
by the chief U.S. dele-
gate to the United
Nations on August 10,
1995, showing alleged
mass graves in Nova
Kasaba, Bosnia (later
found to contain bod-
ies of Muslim civilians 
massacred by the
Bosnian Serbs).  
Aerial imagery from a
NATO handout released
on April 17, 1999,
showing what NATO
described as new
graves near Izbica,
Kosovo. 
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countries or in countries where they do
not wish to get involved, commercial
satellite operators will readily market
such imagery to a host of media and
human rights groups. Such widely
available satellite imagery might deter
states from committing large-scale vio-
lence against ethnic minorities and
might compel the international com-
munity to take action once such acts of
violence are committed.
High-resolution satellite imagery can
also provide state and nonstate actors
with valuable information on how to
respond to humanitarian emergencies.
Large refugee movements can be
tracked using imagery with a resolu-
tion of 1 meter or better. Such imagery
could help determine the direction of
refugee flows, the size of different
refugee pockets, ground surface
features, and the resources available
to humanitarian response teams.
Employing high-resolution satellite
imagery to plan relief operations could
significantly improve the ability of var-
ious groups to alleviate human suffer-
ing in the wake of large-scale humani-
tarian emergencies.
environmental
applications
For the past twenty-seven years, low-
and medium-resolution civilian satel-
lites have provided invaluable data on
the status of the EarthÕs temperature,
land cover, water bodies, and atmos-
phere.11 For example, satellite imagery
has allowed scientists to monitor and
document the depletion of the ozone
layer over the South Pole, the shrinking
of the Aral Sea in the former Soviet
Union, and the rate of loss of the tropi-
cal rainforests in the Amazon basin. In
addition, remote sensing systems have
at times played a central role in manag-
ing serious environmental emergen-
cies. After the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf
Five-meter-resolution
imagery taken by the
Indian Remote
Sensing satellite (IRS-
1D) on May 8, 1999,
depicting the 
destruction left behind
in the wake of a 
powerful tornado near
Oklahoma City.
(Space Im
aging)
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War, the thermal-infrared sensors on
board the Landsat 4 satellite provided
firefighters with critical information on
the exact location of some 529 oil fires
in liberated Kuwait.12 More recently, the
Canadian RADARSAT-1 system helped
avert a potential disaster by providing
timely information on the size and
direction of a large oil slick near the
water intake pipes of a nuclear power
plant on the coast of Japan.
As these examples illustrate, remote
sensing systems have for decades satis-
fied many of the data needs of various
government agencies, scientists, and
environmentalists. In the future, emerg-
ing commercial satellites with higher
spatial and better spectral resolutions
will supplement and complement (but
not replace) existing environmental
monitoring capabilities. The primary
reason is that most environmental
changes are slow, evolving processes
that take place across extensive tracts of
Earth over lengthy periods. To monitor
and document long-term environmen-
tal change, scientists need continuous
coverage of vast regions. The existing
high price of commercial satellite
imagery makes it virtually impossible
for anyone except the most affluent
environmental organizations to pur-
chase large quantities of high-resolution
satellite imagery. Whereas the U.S. gov-
ernment provides Landsat 7 pictures for
$475 to $600 per scene, commercial
satellite operators routinely charge
$4,400 for a comparable product.
Although these prices may decline as
the number of commercial systems in
operation increases, that drop is unlike-
ly any time soon, given that the com-
mercial satellite companies are trying to
recoup investments on the order of hun-
dreds of millions of dollars.
While existing civilian satellites have
a comparative advantage in long-term,
wide-area monitoring of the environ-
ment, emerging commercial satellites
seem to be particularly well suited for
periodic assessments of areas of great-
est concern. Possible environmental
applications of emerging commercial
satellites include: studying the impact
of land development and energy explo-
ration on wilderness areas, developing
more complete wetland inventories,
monitoring the health of vegetation in
all regions of the world but particularly
in remote or inaccessible areas, and
detecting toxic discharges from mines
and production facilities.
Governments, corporations, and con-
servation groups are slowly beginning
to understand the immense potential of
remote sensing data for environmental
monitoring and are taking steps to bet-
ter incorporate such data into their
decision making. In 1995 the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
conducted a study on the possibility of
employing hyperspectral sensors to
monitor toxic runoffs from abandoned
mines. It conducted the experiment at
the CalGulch Mine Superfund site in
Leadville, Colorado, which is home to
hundreds of relict gold, silver, lead, and
zinc mines suspected of contributing
acid drainage and heavy metals to
downstream supplies of drinking water.
Using NASAÕs aerial hyperspectral sen-
sor, the Airborne Visible and Infra-Red
Imaging Spectrometer (AVIRIS), the
EPA was able to study the site while sav-
ing approximately Ò80 percent of the
time and cost of traditional ground-
based analysis.Ó13 After the success of
the CalGulch Mine experiment, the EPA
launched an Advanced Measurement
Initiative (AMI) to accelerate the adop-
tion and application of remote sensing
and other technologies that could pro-
vide more timely, accurate, and cost-
effective environmental monitoring
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data. Under the initiative, the EPA has
undertaken two new projects involving
hyperspectral sensors to monitor the
presence of jarosite (a mineral that can
contribute to acid drainage and the
release of heavy metals into the environ-
ment) in the Ray copper mines in
Arizona, and to measure the concentra-
tion of suspended minerals, chlorophyll,
and dissolved organic carbon in the sur-
face waters of the Neuse River in North
Carolina. The results of both studies
were to be released at the end of 1999.
Mindful of the bad publicity associ-
ated with lax environmental practices,
a number of multinational corpora-
tions have also begun using remote
sensing technologies to police their
own activities. The Texas oil giant,
Texaco, forexample,developedanaerial
hyperspectral sensor called Texaco
Energy and Environmental Multi-
spectral Imaging Spectrometer (TEEMS)
to help it pursue environmentally
sound policies. Once fully operational,
this imagingcapabilitywillallowTexaco
to, among other things, establish envi-
ronmental baselines prior to commenc-
ing exploration, conduct fracture analy-
sis on its vast network of pipelines, iden-
tify oil seeps and oil spills, and, when
necessary, take action to minimize and
reverse damage done to the environment.
The use of remote sensing data for
environmental monitoring is not limit-
ed to state governments and large cor-
porations. Environmental nongovern-
mental organizations have for years
made extensive use of existing relative-
ly low-resolution imagery to monitor
enforcement of the U.S. Endangered
Species Act, document the destruction
of coral reefs around the world, and
generate plans for ecosystem manage-
ment.14 As more sophisticated commer-
cial remote sensing systems become
available, and especially if the prices
drop, it can be expected that environ-
mental groups will expand their activi-
ties, monitoring compliance with exist-
ing environmental standards and pub-
licizing violations.
media uses of
satellite imagery
On Saturday, April 26, 1986, two explo-
sions destroyed Unit 4 of the Chernobyl
nuclear power plant in Ukraine and
released 100 million curies of radionu-
clides into the environment.15 Hoping to
keep the incident secret, the Soviet gov-
ernment immediately sealed off a 100-
mile radius around the stricken reactor
and banned all foreign travel to Kiev, the
largest city nearest the site of the acci-
dent.16 Two days later, as radioactive
clouds began setting off radiation alarms
throughout Europe, the Soviet news
agency Tass confirmed Western suspi-
cions by disclosing that one of its atomic
reactors had indeed been damaged.
Within hours of the announcement
the United StatesÕ top-secret spy satel-
lite, Keyhole (KH-11), began collecting
imagery of the Chernobyl power sta-
tion. By Tuesday, April 29, KH-11 pho-
tos were in the hands of U.S. policy
makers in Washington, D.C. But this
time government officials did not have
exclusive access to satellite imagery.
Less than twenty-four hours after
Keyhole images reached the White
House, the American Broadcasting
Company (ABC) aired medium-resolu-
tion Landsat images of the blazing
nuclear reactor.17 Shortly thereafter, a
number of media organizations began
broadcasting higher resolution SPOT
images of the Chernobyl power plant.
In the decade and a half since the
Chernobyl accident, the use of satellite
photos by news organizations has
increased significantly. Despite the rela-
tively low resolution of publicly avail-
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able satellite systems, media groups
have employed remote sensing technol-
ogy to report on important events such
as the military buildup in the former
Soviet Union, the Persian Gulf War,
weapons proliferation in the third world,
the U.S. assault on Osama bin LadenÕs
hideaway in Afghanistan, the devasta-
tion left by a tornado that swept through
Oklahoma City, the nuclear tests in India
and Pakistan, and, more recently, the
humanitarian atrocities in Kosovo. 
With the advent of commercial high-
resolution satellites, the use of remote
sensing imagery by media groups is like-
ly to grow. Imagery, even relatively fuzzy
commercial satellite photos, allows news
agencies to convey important informa-
tion visually to their audiences. More
important, satellites can go places that are
otherwise inaccessible to media groups.
These two features alone will ensure the
continued use of satellite imagery by
news organizations for years to come. 
business applications
The full range of commercial applications
for satellite imagery is not yet known. A
number of factors, including cost, timeli-
ness, and spectral as well as spatial reso-
lution, will ultimately determine how
narrowly or broadly remote sensing
imagery is employed. However, several
commercial applications of satellite
imagery are worth noting here.
Satellite imagery has important
applications in map making. While 95
percent of the worldÕs land mass is
mapped at a scale of 1:250,000, only 33
percent is mapped at 1:25,000. Less
than 10 percent of Africa and South
America and less than 20 percent of
Asia and Australia are mapped at the
higher scale. In many cases the maps
available at the higher scale are outdated
or incomplete. Emerging high-resolu-
tion commercial satellites will signifi-
cantly improve both the scale and qual-
ity of maps of the more remote and less
developed regions of the world.
Another major commercial applica-
tion of high-resolution satellite imagery
is in the field of agricultural manage-
ment. Agriculture is a volatile field
with pronounced effects on the eco-
nomic well-being and political stability
of nations. Satellite imagery can help
take some of the unpredictability out of
this important sector. Multispectral and
hyperspectral sensors are well suited to
predicting crop yields, detecting crop
disease and insect infestation, and
monitoring thermal stress.18 Satellite
imagery can be used to prepare
detailed maps of agricultural fields to
determine the best seeding and irriga-
tion patterns, as well as the optimum
amounts of fertilizer and pesticides
needed to obtain higher crop yields.
Satellite imagery can also help pin-
point the probable location of nonre-
newable natural resources, a capability
that can dramatically reduce the eco-
nomic risks of exploration. Radar
imagery, for example, has for years
helped oil companies identify new off-
shore oil reserves. According to
Roger Mitchell of the Earth Satellite
Corporation, nearly 80 percent of off-
shore oil exploration starts by searching
for oil seeps.19 OilÕs viscosity retards
wave formation, causing a Òcalm spotÓ
on the ocean surface. Radar satellites
can detect these calm spots and analyze
their suitability for future exploration. 
Similarly, hyperspectral sensors can
inspect the EarthÕs surface for unique
spectral signatures associated with par-
ticular resources. Once a signature is
detected, mining companies can begin
exploration activities with much
greater confidence. In the next few
years, hyperspectral sensors may revo-
lutionize exploration for natural
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resources in all corners of the world.
Unlike the traditional methods, satel-
lites can image any region on Earth
regardless of its accessibility and can
provide accurate information at a sig-
nificantly lower cost. However, for
hyperspectral imagery to be useful,
additional research is needed to com-
pile a more thorough library of the
spectral signatures associated with dif-
ferent natural resources.
Urban planners can also use satellite
imagery to improve efficiency and
reduce costs. Houses, water tanks,
canals, sidewalks, pavements, and park-
ing lots are easily distinguishable on
high-resolution satellite imagery. City
officials can use such information to plan
new development projects and design
improved networks of public utilities.
Remote sensing data can provide engi-
neers and construction companies with
valuable information on soil composi-
tion and structural morphology before
substantial investments are made.
Finally, remote sensing data provide
corporations new opportunities to spy
on their competitors. A comparison of
archived and more recent satellite
imagery can reveal important informa-
tion about the production capacity of
rival companies at dispersed locations
around the world. For example, high-
resolution satellite imagery can reveal
new construction, new types of ship-
ping containers on loading docks, or
an increase in the number of rail
cars used to distribute products.20
Although traditionally observers on
the ground have obtained such infor-
mation, commercial satellite imagery
may prove to be more cost-effective
and significantly less intrusive.
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There has never been a ruling on the legality of space-based imagery for competitive intel-
ligence. The only relevant case, which may form the basis for all future litigation, dates back
to 1970. In E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc. v. Christopher, DuPont sued the Christopher
brothers for taking aerial pictures of its Texas plant while the plant was under construction
to learn DuPontÕs new process for methanol production.1 In this case, the court ruled in
DuPontÕs favor, citing the steps taken by the company to protect its trade secrets and the
improper means used by the Christopher brothers to uncover those secrets.
The advent of commercial high-resolution satellite imagery may have a profound impact on
how cases involving remote sensing imagery are adjudicated in the future. In DuPont the
court adjudged the actions of the Christophers to be improper primarily because, at that
time, the method they used to determine DuPontÕs secrets was considered so out of the ordi-
nary.2 Once high-resolution satellite imagery becomes widely available, it will be harder to
argue that overhead observation of the production facilities of rivals is an extraordinary
and, therefore, improper means for carrying out competitive intelligence. Instead, business-
es may have to take additional steps to protect valuable trade secrets.
Even assuming that the use of satellite imagery for competitive intelligence is considered
unlawful, it will be difficult for corporations to prove any wrongdoing by industrial com-
petitors. Current statutes do not require satellite operators to disclose either their imagery
or the identity of their clients to third parties. Thus, it is nearly impossible for companies to
know whether a passing satellite collected imagery of their facilities and, if so, who asked
for specific images. This task becomes even more arduous as the number of domestic and,
more importantly, international sources of high-resolution imagery increases. Whereas
greater regulation and closer government scrutiny can restrain domestic vendors, control-
ling international vendors is likely to prove far more elusive.
1Fred Wergeles, "Commercial Satellite Imagery: New Opportunities for Competitive Intelligence," Competitive
Intelligence Magazine, vol. 1, no. 1 (April-June 1998), p. 38.
2Ibid.
competitive intelligence or industrial espionage?
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Given all these applications, it is perhaps
not surprising that since the first launch
of a civilian remote sensing satellite in
1972, some twenty-one governmental
and private entities in thirteen countries
have committed billions of dollars to the
development and operation of land
observation satellites and have espoused
relatively open data distribution prac-
tices. Many of these programs have
already borne fruit. As of October 1999
there were eight sources of high-resolu-
tion film, electro-optical, and radar
imagery (see Appendix A).21 The Russian
KVR-1000 camera, for example, provides
customers with 2-meter panchromatic
photographs of Earth. The Indian IRS-1C
and -1D satellites routinely take 5-meter
panchromatic and 23-meter multispectral
images. The French SPOT-1, -2, and -4
systems provide 10-meter panchromatic
and 20-meter multispectral images of
objects on the ground. Once system test-
ing and calibration are complete, Space
ImagingÕs IKONOS-2 satellite will, for
the first time, provide 1-meter panchro-
matic and 3-meter multispectral images.
At present the Canadian RADARSAT-1
remains the only source of high-resolu-
tion radar imagery, providing consumers
with 8-meter resolution SAR images.
Over the next five years, however, the
number of high-resolution electro-optical
and SAR satellites in orbit is expected to
explode. By December 2000 at least two
more private U.S. companies, EarthWatch
and OrbImage, will have launched sys-
tems capable of collecting 1-meter
panchromatic and 3- to 5-meter multi-
spectral images of Earth. OrbImageÕs sec-
ond high-resolution satellite, OrbView 4,
will also carry the worldÕs first hyperspec-
tral sensor, the WarFighter. Although
access to WarFighterÕs 8-meter resolution
imagery will be restricted to the U.S. gov-
ernment, OrbImage will be able to sell 24-
meter hyperspectral images to non-
governmental entities. Space Technology
Development Corporation is developing,
in conjunction with the U.S. Navy, a high-
resolution system capable of collecting 5-
meter panchromatic and 30-meter hyper-
spectral images. Southern CaliforniaÕs
Research and Development Laboratories
is currently developing a 1-meter resolu-
tion radar system for launch by 2001.
In addition to the United States, many
of the countries already active in remote
sensing plan to have more capable satel-
lites operational by 2003. India plans to
launch IRS-P5, which will be able to
detect objects as small as 2.5 meters
across, and IRS-P6, which will be capa-
ble of providing 5-meter panchromatic
and 23-meter multispectral images.
France plans to augment its capabilities
by adding SPOT-5 to the constellation of
SPOT satellites already in orbit. SPOT-5
will provide 2.5-meter panchromatic
and 10-meter multispectral images of
the planet. Canada will launch a sec-
ond generation of radar satellites,
RADARSAT-2, with a resolution of 3
meters. Russia may launch the more
advanced RESURS-DK system, which
has the ability to take 2-meter panchro-
matic and 3-meter multispectral and
radar images of objects on the ground.
growth of the commercial
remote sensing industry 3
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Also within the next five years a num-
ber of new countries will enter the mar-
ket for high-resolution remote sensing
data. Starting in 2000, West Indian Space
Ltd., a joint venture of two Israeli and one
American firms, plans to launch a con-
stellation of three satellites able to pro-
vide 0.8- to 1.8-meter panchromatic
images.22 Japan is currently developing
one satellite, ALOS-1, with a 2.5-meter
panchromatic sensor and two 10-meter
multispectral and SAR sensors. Japan is
also considering developing a second
satellite, Info-Collectic, with 1-meter
panchromatic and 3-meter SAR sensors.
Taiwan is constructing a 2-meter
panchromatic system that will be ready
for launch in 2002. China and Brazil have
undertaken a joint effort that may ulti-
mately lead to the development of
CBERS III and IV, with the ability to col-
lect 5-meter panchromatic and 10-meter
multispectral images. Brazil and
Argentina have agreed to develop the
SABIA system, which will have a 6-meter
multispectral capability, by 2003.
Pakistan, the Republic of Korea (South
Korea), and Australia are also eager to
enter the business of providing remote
sensing data, albeit with lower resolution
systems. Pakistan is developing the Badr-
C satellite, able to take color images of
objects 10 meters or bigger. South Korea is
currently developing the Kompsat-1 sys-
tem with 10-meter panchromatic and 20-
meter multispectral resolutions. The South
Korean government is also planning to
launch Kompsat-2, an improved version of
the Kompsat satellite, by 2003. Assuming
continuity of funding, Australia intends to
develop the Aries satellite, to be equipped
with 10-meter panchromatic and 30-meter
hyperspectral sensors.
This burgeoning global interest reflects
economic, political, and technological
trends that have fundamentally reshaped
the commercial satellite sector, leading
governments and private companies to
invest large sums in the belief that the
market for space-based remote sensing
data will grow exponentially. One is that
the market for satellite imagery is already
growing. Over the past decade it has more
than tripled in size, jumping from $39 mil-
lion in 1988 to $139 million in 1998.23 It is
estimated that by 2005 the market will
reach $420 million, an increase of over 202
percent.24 Potential customers include
farmers, city planners, map makers, envi-
ronmentalists, emergency response teams,
news organizations, surveyors, geologists,
mining and oil companies, timber har-
vesters, and domestic as well as foreign
military planners and intelligence organi-
zations. Many of these groups already use
imagery provided by existing aerial and
space-based imagery platforms, despite
the fact that these systems lack some of the
unique capabilities of the emerging com-
mercial satellitesÑbetter spectral and spa-
tial resolutions, greater timeliness, access
to remote areas, non-invasiveness, cost
effectiveness, and ease of use. Satellite
operators contend that in the next few
years the demand for data from emerging
space-based remote sensing will grow sig-
nificantly, at times complementing but
often replacing existing sources of remote
sensing imagery. This optimism about the
future of the remote sensing market, cou-
pled with the desire to capture a larger
share of the market, has driven many
companies to invest in commercial satel-
lites and associated ground systems.
The collapse of the Soviet Union also
aided the growth of the remote sensing
industry. Before 1992, both Eastern and
Western bloc countries subordinated eco-
nomic interests to the conduct of the cold
war. They often barred investors from
developing or employing sensitive dual-
use technologies for commercial purpos-
es. After the dissolution of the Soviet
threat, many of the political barriers that
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had stifled private initiatives in high-reso-
lution remote sensing evaporated.
In the United States and Russia, the
end of the cold war had the added bene-
fit of making existing sensitive remote
sensing technologies available to the pri-
vate sector. After the collapse of the
Soviet Union, Russian firms began mar-
keting 2-meter resolution satellite pho-
tographs from the governmentÕs KVR-
1000 camera, which was designed for
and used by the Soviet intelligence com-
munity.26 Discussions are now underway
to market even higher resolution pho-
tographs (1-meter resolution) from
Russian spy satellites. In the United
States, military contracting companies,
including Lockheed Martin, Ball
Aerospace, and Northrop Grumman,
which during the cold war had been
deeply involved in the development of
the highly classified U.S. aerial and
space-based reconnaissance programs,
were allowed to offer their technical
expertise and services to commercial
satellite companies.
Another factor facilitating the growth
of the remote sensing industry has been
the recent technological advances in satel-
lite data acquisition, storage, and process-
ing, along with the ability quickly and
efficiently to transfer such data files elec-
tronically. In the early 1980s information
technology had not yet advanced to the
point of providing a robust infrastruc-
ture.27 Since then the situation has
changed dramatically. The advent of pow-
erful personal computers capable of han-
dling large files of data, the development
of geographic information system soft-
ware designed to manipulate spatial data,
and the growth of mechanisms for data
distribution such as CD-ROM disks and
the Internet have all facilitated the mar-
keting and sale of satellite imagery.
Last, active government support has
tremendously encouraged the growth of
commercial sales of imagery in a number
of countries. In France, Russia, and India,
for example, while governments own
and operate the satellite systems, once
the imagery is collected, private firms mar-
ket and distribute the data. In the case of
France, the French Space Agency operates
and maintains the SPOT satellites, leaving
the sale of imagery to the Spot Image
Corporation.28 The Russian and Indian
governments maintain control of data dis-
tribution through state-controlled agencies
(Sovinformsputnik in Russia and Antrix
in India), which have separate agreements
with U.S.-based companies to expand their
marketing capabilities. Sovinformsputnik
has entered into a joint venture with Aerial
Images, Inc.ofRaleigh,NorthCarolina,and
Central Trading Systems, Inc. of Hunting-
ton Bay, New York, to establish the ter-
raserver data distribution system, for mar-
keting SPIN-2 products. Antrix has con-
tracted with Space Imaging of Thornton,
Colorado, to expand the sale of imagery
fromIndiaÕsIRS-1Cand-1Dsatellites.
In Canada, following years of govern-
ment control over the RADARSAT pro-
gram, the Canadian Space Agency has
agreed to transfer the program to the pri-
vate sector. In December 1998 Industry
Minister John Manley announced that
MacDonald Dettwiler of Richmond,
British Columbia, would develop and
operate RADARSAT-2, the successor to
the government-owned and -operated
RADARSAT-1.29 To facilitate the transfer
of the RADARSAT program from the
public to the private sector, the Canadian
government has agreed to provide $225
million of the $305 million (Canadian)
needed to construct the satellite. Under
the terms of the agreement MacDonald
Dettwiler will reimburse the government
of Canada with RADARSAT-2 imagery
once the satellite is operational.30
The support of the Israeli government
has been indispensable to the plans of
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West Indian Space, an American-Israeli
joint venture comprised of the govern-
ment-owned Israel Aircraft Industries Ltd.
of Lod, Israel, El-Op Electro-Optics
Industries of Rehovot, Israel, and Core
Software Technology, Inc. of Pasadena
California. The Israeli government has
assisted West Indian Space by permitting
the company to use Israeli spy satellite
technology for commercial purposes. In
addition, it has agreed to purchase all
imagery collected by the companyÕs three
planned satellites over the Middle East for
a period of eight years, providing both a
market for West Indian Space products
and a means of ensuring that regional
rivals do not gain access to the imagery.31
In the same manner, the government of
the United States has been central to the
success of the U.S. commercial land obser-
vation satellite industry. Ever since the
late 1970s, successive U.S. administra-
tions have enacted legislation to encour-
age private initiatives in remote sensing.
Wary that the customer base for satellite
imagery was not sufficiently mature to
sustain an entirely private satellite indus-
try, the government initially focused on
commercializing NASAÕs civilian satellite
program, known as Landsat (for a com-
prehensive history of the Landsat pro-
gram see Appendix B). In July 1984,
President Ronald Reagan signed the Land
Remote Sensing Commercialization Act
(Public Law [P.L.] 98-365), instructing the
Department of Commerce, which was
then in charge of the Landsat program, to
select a private contractor to operate the
Landsat systems and market the resulting
data. Although the act also established a
licensing and oversight mechanism for a
commercial remote sensing industry, no
such industry emerged. In part the reason
was that the law required commercial
operators to sell all available imagery to
anyone who wanted it at a set, nondis-
criminatory price, making imagery less
attractive to the many potential users who
wanted exclusive access to the imagery
they purchased.
In a second attempt to jumpstart private
interest in commercial land observation
satellites, the Congress passed the Land
Remote Sensing Policy Act (P.L. 102-555),
which was signed into law in October
1992. The new law allowed satellite oper-
ators to sell any given image exclusively to
one customer without any restrictions on
pricing. To reconcile U.S. domestic law
with the 1986 United Nations Legal
Principles (see page 31), the act required
private companies to make unenhanced
data available to the governments of the
sensed states. In March 1994, in a further
attempt to clarify the regulatory frame-
work and improve U.S. commercial com-
petitiveness, President Bill Clinton issued
Presidential Decision Directive 23. The
directive, among other things, loosened
the restrictions on the sale of high-resolu-
tion satellite imagery to foreign entities.32
The 1992 legislation and the 1994 direc-
tive spurred significant interest in commer-
cial remote sensing. In July 1992, shortly
before passage of the Land Remote Sensing
Policy Act, WorldView Inc. filed the first
application for a license to operate a high-
resolution commercial satellite. Since then
eleven more U.S. companies have applied
for such licenses, investing an estimated
$1.2 billion in commercial satellite remote
sensing activities33 (see Table 2). One of
these, Space Imaging, successfully
launched the worldÕs first 1-meter resolu-
tion satellite on September 24, 1999.
The U.S. government has also tried to
promote the growth of the U.S. commer-
cial remote sensing industry through
direct subsidies to private companies and
guaranteed purchases of data. EarthWatch,
Space Imaging, and OrbImage have, for
example, all been awarded between $2
million and $4 million to upgrade their
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ground systems to facilitate the transfer of
imagery data from their satellites to the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
In addition, the U.S. Air Force has agreed
to subsidize OrbImage for up to $30 mil-
lion to develop and deploy the WarFighter
sensor on board its OrbView 4 satellite,
which will have both military and com-
mercial applications. Similarly, the Office
of Naval Research recently concluded an
agreement with the Space Technology
Development Corporation whereby the
U.S. Navy will provide the company
approximately $60 million to develop
and deploy the Naval EarthMap
Observer satellite. 
In addition to direct subsidies to satellite
companies, various U.S. national security
agencies have reached separate agree-
ments with a number of current and
future satellite operators to purchase high-
resolution satellite imagery. Since FY1998,
for example, the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency has Òspent about $5
million annually on commercial imagery,Ó
and has promised to increase its purchas-
es of data significantly Òonce the 1-meter
commercial imagery systems are avail-
able.Ó34 According to a number of sources,
the U.S. intelligence community as a
whole plans to spend $1 billion during the
next five years on purchases of satellite
imagery from private U.S. sources and
development of the capability needed to
exploit such imagery fully.35
the future of the
commercial remote
sensing market
The market for satellite imagery will, as
noted, continue to grow, although the
scope and pace are uncertain. Four fac-
tors will ultimately determine the size
of the market: the extent of government
interference; the price of satellite
imagery; the timeliness of access to
remote sensing data; and the ability of
satellite operators to market their prod-
ucts to new customers.
Government Regulation
As of the end of 1999, none of the space-
faring nations has allowed the flowering
of a truly independent commercial remote
sensing industry driven solely by the tides
of the free market. Given the dual-use
nature of remote sensing data, states have
consistently opted to subordinate eco-
nomic gains to security and political con-
siderations. Most countries, including
France, India, and Russia, have chosen to
maintain physical control over their coun-
tryÕs satellite systems and all the data col-
lected. In contrast, Canada, Israel, and the
United States have permitted private com-
panies to launch and operate land obser-
vation satellites, with the stipulation that,
when necessary, national authorities can
temporarily block the collection and dis-
semination of satellite imageryÑa policy
commonly referred to as shutter control.36
Although some form of government
supervision may be essential, commercial
operators fear that excessive government
interference could stifle the growth of the
market for commercial satellite data, both
regionally and globally. Potential con-
sumers of satellite imagery need assur-
ances that reliable sources of imagery exist
before they alter established procedures or
devise new ways to incorporate satellite
imagery into their day-to-day activities. In
the absence of such assurances, growth of
the remote sensing market could suffer.
Cost
Commercial imagery prices currently
range from as little as $10 for historic
American and Soviet reconnaissance pho-
tographs to as much as $10,000 for more
recent high-resolution images. On aver-
age, however, consumers interested in
high-resolution commercial satellite
imagery can expect to pay between $1,000
and $4,000 for a single image with a
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ground resolution of 10 meters to 1 meter.
Generally, the cost of imagery increases
proportionally with either higher resolu-
tion or greater area coverage. At these
prices it is unlikely that anyone except for
the most affluent organizations, typically
government agencies and large corpora-
tions, will be able to purchase large quan-
tities of commercial satellite imagery. Even
though many other potential users, such as
humanitarian relief agencies and environ-
mental activists, could benefit from the
information contained in satellite imagery,
few will be able to afford regular purchases
at current prices.
Timeliness
At present, it takes anywhere from two
days to well over four weeks before cus-
tomers receive imagery from vendors.
This time lapse clearly is a major problem
for users of imagery with rigid time con-
straints. Data providers are well aware of
this fact and are preparing to meet the
challenge. As Appendix A indicates, most
of the new commercial satellites have a
revisit cycle (the time it takes to pass twice
over any site on Earth) of one to five days.
However, with the number of satellites in
orbit increasing as existing companies
deploy larger constellations of satellites
and new companies enter the market, the
time it takes to image any location on
Earth is likely to decrease considerably.
Moreover, satellite operators claim that
once the imagery is collected, it can be
downloaded, processed, and distributed
to customers within one to four hours. The
implication is that in the near future on
average it could take as little as 25 to 40
hours from the time the customer places
an order to receipt of the images.
Marketing
The ability of satellite operators to make
the value and utility of space-based data
known to new potential consumers will
also have a pronounced effect on the
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growth of the imagery market. One of the
main reasons for the relatively slow
growth of the remote sensing market has
been a lack of knowledge about the poten-
tial benefits of satellite imagery. Many
businesses, nongovernmental organiza-
Developing a single high-resolution commercial satellite costs anywhere between $45 mil-
lion and $300 million.1,2 Building the associated ground segment adds another $33 to $65
million to the total cost.3 A basic insurance package and the launch vehicle raise the price
tag by an estimated $19-132 million.4 In total, commercial companies need to invest
between $97 million and $497 million before they collect any revenues (see Table 3).
The exorbitant cost of entering the remote sensing market has compelled many commer-
cial satellite operators to seek a variety of domestic and international sources of funding.
For example, Spot Image, although a French company operating under French laws, has
several prominent foreign shareholders, including Aerospatiale-Matra group (Italy),
Alcatel Space Industries (Spain), and the Swedish Space Corporation (Sweden). Similarly,
the U.S. company, Space Imaging, which successfully launched the worldÕs first 1-meter
resolution commercial satellite on September 24, 1999, has secured funds not only from
U.S. sources, but also from a number of foreign investors, such as JapanÕs Mitsubishi
Corporation, SingaporeÕs Van Der Horst Ltd., South KoreaÕs Hyundai Space & Aircraft,
SwedenÕs Swedish Space Corporation, and ThailandÕs Loxley Public Company Ltd. Earth
Watch, another U.S. company, has obtained funding from the Japanese conglomerate
Hitachi Ltd. and the Italian firm Telespazio.
This internationalization of the space industry may present yet another challenge to the
ability of nations to pursue the contradictory policy of limiting access to high-resolution
satellite imagery for national security purposes while promoting the growth of a profitable
remote sensing industry. Whereas domestic investors may be more receptive to the securi-
ty interests of their state governments, foreign investors are interested only in maximizing
their own profits. Consequently, any policy that is likely to reduce sales is also likely to
deter foreign investments. This restraint may over time cripple the domestic remote sens-
ing industry as foreign and, perhaps, domestic financiers seek more profitable investments
in less restrictive commercial environments.
1For a discussion of the globalization of the remote sensing industry, visit the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace website at www.ceip.org/programs/transparency/RemoteSensingConf/WilliamsonPage.htm
and www.ceip.org/programs/transparency/RemoteSensingConf/StoneyPage.htm. 
2Satellite costs are directly related to key system characteristics such as the number and type of sensors, spatial
and spectral resolutions, swath width, platform stability, and satellite agility. Moreover, satellite costs also
reflect whether a planned system makes use of existing technologies or whether substantial funds are needed
for additional research and development activities. Numbers are based on figures provided by commercial
satellite operators and aerospace industry officials.
3Jim Martin, Raytheon Systems Company, Arlington, Virginia, September 29, 1999, provided the ground segment costs.
4In general, insurance costs can be expected to range between 13 percent and 20 percent of the combined value
of the satellite and the launch vehicle. Launch costs depend on the weight of the satellite and the type of launch
vehicle used to deploy the system. Clayton Mowry, of Satellite Industries Association, Alexandria, Virginia,
September 28, 1999, provided the insurance costs. The launch vehicle costs can be found in Commercial Space
Transportation, U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, D.C., 1999.
tions, and even government agencies are
for the most part unaware of the different
applications of remote sensing data.
Aggressive salesmanship is needed to
develop the market further and demon-
strate the utility of satellite imagery.
globalized ownership?
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The widespread availability of commer-
cial high-resolution satellite imagery will
for the first time reveal to many people
and organizations information to which
they never before had access. Some
have celebrated this new development,
calling it the emerging era of global
transparency. But transparency has both
positive and negative consequences.
In the field of international relations,
greater transparency could allay ten-
sions among international rivals and
herald a new era of peaceful coexis-
tence. As one observer stated, ÒNations
that know what their enemies are doing
are less likely to increase world ten-
sions through activities born of fear.
And nations that know their enemies
are observing them are far less likely to
threaten international peace through
rash behavior.Ó37 According to this
view, if everyone is constantly watch-
ing everyone else, surprise attacks
become impossible and aggressive
actions unrewarding. 
This premise may often be true, but
not always. When the success of
aggression is dependent on the element
of surprise, transparency will indeed
reduce the incidence of aggression. But
not all aggression requires surprise to
succeed. Transparency could aggravate
interstate conflicts by removing ambi-
guities about relative capabilities and
allowing states to exploit each othersÕ
weaknesses. To the degree that govern-
ments new to remote sensing misinter-
pret what they see, imagery could cre-
ate groundless fears.
Even under the best of circumstances,
transparency cannot ensure that the
right decisions are made. Transparency
reveals behavior, but not intent.38 If
enemy troops are detected massing
along the border, is that just harmless
posturing, or are they preparing for a
preemptive strike? If states reach the
wrong conclusions, they may find
themselves spiraling uncontrollably
toward war.
Transparency could also complicate
decision making by introducing new
participants into the policy process.
Widespread availability of high-resolu-
tion satellite imagery would allow pri-
vate citizens, nongovernmental organi-
zations, and particularly the media to
take a more active role in policy mak-
ing. These groups could independently
use satellite imagery to monitor state
compliance with international agree-
ments, expose environmental degrada-
tion, and publicize large-scale humani-
tarian emergencies. In some situations
civil society groups and the media
might be able to compel states to take
action, even when government officials
would much prefer to do nothing. 
Here again, there are no guarantees
that greater transparency will produce
better outcomes. Nongovernmental
organizations and the media rarely
have the resources, analytical skills, or
technical expertise that are more readi-
ly available to state governments. It is
inevitable that organizations will make
mistakes as they begin to increasingly
rely on satellite imagery. The media
drawbacks of commercial
satellite imaging4
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have already made such errors on at
least four occasions. During the 1986
Chernobyl accident, in an attempt to be
the first with breaking news, a number
of media organizations misinterpreted
imagery and erroneously reported that
two nuclear reactors had melted
down.39 Just a few weeks later, a num-
ber of networks in the United States
cited SPOT imagery of a Soviet nuclear
proving grounds at Semipalatinsk as
evidence of MoscowÕs decision to
resume nuclear testing. Further analy-
sis revealed that the networks had com-
pletely misinterpreted the imagery,
falsely presenting routine activities in a
far more pernicious light.40
Another error occurred in 1992 when
a newspaper called the European pub-
lished SPOT images of what it labeled
an Algerian nuclear research complex.
Subsequent analysis of the image
revealed that the feature in the photo
was not a nuclear research facility but a
military airbase. To make matters
worse, the European had published the
image upside down and backwards.41
More recently, on May 25, 1998,
Newsweek magazine published a satellite
image that it claimed showed the site in
the northern desert state of Rajasthan
where India had conducted five nuclear
tests. Newsweek maintained that the
image dated from a week before the tests
and ran the picture with several captions
identifying specific objects and installa-
tions. None of the information was cor-
rect. It turned out that the imagery had
been collected over five years prior to the
blasts, and the feature Newsweek identi-
fied as the hole where one of IndiaÕs
nuclear explosions took place was in fact
an animal holding pen.42
Fortunately, no grave damage has yet
resulted from the erroneous reports
that have appeared, but it is optimistic
to think that continued carelessness
will have no consequences. False
reporting, whether deliberate or unin-
tentional, could easily embitter rela-
tions among nations and prevent the
resolution of outstanding disputes.
Transparency raises major economic
concerns as well. Radar, multispectral,
and especially hyperspectral sensors
may allow extraction companies to
know more about a countryÕs natural
resources than the countryÕs own gov-
ernment. This disparity in knowledge
could place state officials at a consider-
able disadvantage when negotiating
drilling rights and mining agreements.
As mentioned, governments are not the
only ones that may feel an acute sense
of vulnerability. Corporations may find
themselves being observed by competi-
tors trying to keep tabs on their con-
struction of new production facilities
around the world and estimate the size
of their production runs by looking at
their emissions. 
In short, the emerging global trans-
parency resulting from high-resolution
commercial remote sensing satellites
promises both benefits and costs. The
challenge is to devise policies that har-
ness the benefits of growing interna-
tional transparency while minimizing its
many potential negative consequences.
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challenges of acquiring and interpreting imagery
Although a picture may be worth a thousand words, without context it reveals very little.
A picture of arid, cracked mud has very different meaning depending on whether the site
is a desert riverbed during the dry season or a spot that used to be several feet under the
fast-shrinking Aral Sea. Getting useful information out of satellite imagery requires signif-
icant prior knowledge about the precise site an image shows and what the image means.
If high-resolution satellite imagery is to fulfill its promise, much will depend on the ability
of satellite operators to obtain the imagery that addresses the specific needs of different
consumers and on the ability of analysts to derive useful information from the mountains
of transmitted data. In other words, data acquisition and interpretation are as important
as the satellites themselves.
To collect imagery of a particular site or activity, satellite operators need to ascertain the
exact coordinates of the target. Satellites, particularly high-resolution systems, cannot find
violations of international treaties, signs of humanitarian atrocities, or evidence of envi-
ronmental contamination unless they are told where and when to look. This precision can
sometimes be very difficult, especially if the target is mobile and even more so if the target
is concealed through denial and deception techniques. Moreover, it is not always possible
to have a satellite at the right place at the right time. Existing commercial satellites can
image any spot on earth within 1 to 24 days, depending on the location of the target and
the availability of various systems. At present, most of the globe remains hidden most of
the time. Continuous global coverage will gradually become available in the next few
years as more commercial systems are launched, but until it is available, access to timely
satellite imagery will be limited and uncertain.
The technical limitations of emerging systems and the conditions under which they must
operate compound the difficulty of collecting useful satellite imagery (see box, page 3).
Electro-optical sensors, for example, can provide extremely useful imagery to consumers,
but they cannot operate at night or in poor weather. Radar satellites can operate day and
night and under all climatic conditions, but few of the new systems provide radar
imagery, and radar does not provide the same spatial and spectral information available
from the more common systems.
While the advent of 1-meter resolution satellite technology is a gigantic step, it, too, has
obvious limitations. As the image on page 26 indicates, considerably more information can
be derived from the 1-meter resolution image of this Yannan-class Chinese ship than from
the 5-meter resolution image. But even the higher resolution does not show important
information, including available weapon systems, onboard cargo, and key features such as
the mast and boom. Even if all the planned systems become operational, much will
remain hidden from prying eyes.
Assuming that the right imagery is collected by the right satellite, to make sense of it,
photo analysts need to understand weather conditions, surface features, seasonal changes,
shadows, surroundings, and differing shapes and sizes.1 In addition, they need a great
deal of prior knowledge about what various objects look like from space. It does very little
good to acquire an image of a clandestine missile site if the analyst viewing the image
does not know what a missile site looks like. 
Mastering these challenges requires years of training and experience. In the government
sector, analysts undergo sixteen weeks of basic training and work one-and-a-half years
before they reach the apprenticeship level.2 Even so, there is an estimated 90 percent error
rate among government imagery analysts during their first three years on the job.3 To
avoid endless debate about what particular images really show, photo analysts must go
through extensive training not only in the beginning of their careers but also every time
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they shift the focus of their work. Analysts who specialize in interpreting and analyzing
the activities of ground forces cannot readily become experts on nuclear testing or envi-
ronmental issues. In addition, peer review must be part of every analystÕs daily work to
minimize mistakes.
Last and perhaps most important, satellite imagery cannot unlock every secret. While the
new high-resolution remote sensing systems will be able to detect large-scale troop move-
ments, mass graves, and deforestation, they will not be able to reveal the intentions of
those troops or who is buried in the mass graves, or how the deforestation can be
reversed. In virtually all cases, other sources of information will be necessary to unmask
what cannot be observed from space.
1Robert Osterhout, Director, Spatial Information Customer Support Center, Science Applications International
Corporation (SAIC), statement made during the ÒNo More Secrets? Policy Implications of Commercial Remote
Sensing SatellitesÓ conference at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 26, 1999. For transcripts
of OsterhoutÕs remarks, visit the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace website at www.ceip.org/pro-
grams/transparency/RemoteSensingConf/OsterhoutPage.htm.
2Ibid.
3Steven Livingston, statement made during the ÒNo More Secrets? Policy Implications of Commercial Remote
Sensing SatellitesÓ conference at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. May 26, 1999. For RealVideo
of LivingstonÕs presentation, visit the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace website at
www.ceip.org/programs/transparency/RemoteSensingConf/LivingstonPage.htm.
5 meter
1 meter
20 centimeter
Comparing resolutions: Three views of the
same Yannan-class Chinese ship at 5-meter,
1-meter, and 20-centimeter resolutions.
(Agence France Presse/downgraded imagery
provided by Vipin Gupta, Sandia National
Laboratories.)
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Over a decade ago, an article on the
then-nascent commercial satellite
industry observed that Òthe instinct of
governments confronted by new tech-
nologies is generally to bring them
under control (or at least try to), espe-
cially when those technologies are
related to matters of power and poli-
tics.Ó43 In the case of high-resolution
remote sensing satellites this observa-
tion has been borne out. Concerned
with the consequences of unchecked
global transparency, states have consid-
ered a number of different options that
may or may not prove workable.
unilateral measures
In addition to furthering U.S. commer-
cial competitiveness, Presidential
Decision Directive-23 also empowered
the Secretary of Commerce to limit
commercial satellite operations Òduring
periods when national security or inter-
national obligations and/or foreign
policies [of the United States] may be
compromised, as defined by the
Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of
State, respectively.Ó44 This policy of
shutter control was the result of the
U.S. governmentÕs desire to balance its
competing interests with respect to
commercial satellite imagery.45
Satellite imagery represents a classic
case of the difficulty of regulating the
ÒexportÓ of dual-use goods (that is,
goods with both civilian and military
applications). There are powerful
incentives working at cross purposes:
economic interests want to maintain a
major U.S. presence in what could be a
large and highly profitable industry
that the United States pioneered,
whereas national security interests
want to prevent potential adversaries
from using the imagery against the
United States or its allies, and foreign
policy interests want to avoid having
certain situations publicized. Yet efforts
to deny imagery to potential enemies
undercut the building of a market for
U.S. companies and may leave the field
to competitors. As one former govern-
ment official has observed, Òthe surest
way to lose to increasing international
competition is to adopt a restrictive reg-
ulatory environment at home which
encourages customers to seek out for-
eign sources.Ó46 After all, imagery
consumers who know access to
imagery may be cut off at any time
by the vagaries of U.S. foreign policy
concerns may prefer to build com-
mercial relationships with other, more
reliable providers.
In addition, unilateral measures are
likely to be far more harmful to the
competitiveness of U.S.-based imagery
providers than to the competitiveness
of any of their economic rivals. Unlike
Canada, France, India, Israel, and
Russia, the national security interests of
the United States are significantly
broader geographically. Unilateral con-
trols could translate into more frequent
interruptions in the availability of
imagery from U.S. sources, giving con-
sumers yet another reason to seek alter-
native suppliers.
current policy choices5
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In the United States, shutter control
faces an additional challenge: it may be
unconstitutional. As noted, the media
have already made extensive use of
satellite imagery, and some news pro-
ducers are eagerly anticipating the
emergence of the new high-resolution
systems. The Radio-Television News
Directors Association argues vehe-
mently that the existing standards vio-
late the First Amendment by allowing
the government to impose Òprior
restraintÓ on the flow of information,
with no need to prove clear and present
danger or imminent national harm to
an impartial judge.47 If the U.S. govern-
ment exercises shutter control in any
but the most compelling circumstances,
a court challenge is inevitable.
It is also not clear whether shutter
control will do much to protect U.S.
interests. Although U.S. satellites are
more advanced than any of the systems
currently in orbit, other than spy satel-
lites, they hardly have the sky to them-
selves. Canada, France, India, and
Russia are already providing high-reso-
lution optical and radar imagery to
consumers throughout the world, with
Brazil, China, Israel, Pakistan, South
Korea, and Taiwan getting ready to
enter the commercial remote sensing
market. Given the large number of
alternative sources of imagery, unilater-
al shutter control by itself cannot afford
the United States any meaningful level
of protection. 
bilateral and multi-
lateral approaches
An alternative is to try to get other
operators of high-resolution satellites
to voluntarily restrict the collection and
dissemination of sensitive imagery
from their systems. Israel has already
reached such an agreement with the
United States. Following intense lobby-
ing by Israeli officials and a number of
pro-Israeli groups, the U.S. government
adopted an amendment to the 1997
National Defense Authorization Act
(commonly known as the Kyl-
Bingaman amendment). It forbids U.S.
companies from collecting or selling
imagery of the entire country of Israel
Òunless such imagery is no more
detailed or precise than satellite
imagery. . . that is routinely available
from [other] commercial sources.Ó48
Although passage of the Kyl-
Bingaman amendment was a clear vic-
tory for the supporters of the bilateral
approach, this victory will likely be
short-lived. The U.S. decision to limit
collection of high-resolution commer-
cial imagery of Israel was based on fifty
years of close cooperation between the
two countries. Israel does not enjoy
similar relationships with other space-
faring nations. It is rather unlikely that
Israel will be able to elicit similar con-
cessions from other actors.
The feasibility of forging a multilater-
al control regime is even more uncer-
tain. States are unwilling to forgo eco-
nomic gains unless they are confronted
with a clear and overwhelming threat.
To most countries, access to high-reso-
lution satellite imagery by third-rate
powers does not constitute such a
threat. Given that U.S. and Israeli firms
will be the first suppliers of 1-meter
satellite imagery and in all likelihood
will dominate the market, later entrants
will have no choice but to compete for
the segments that are still untapped.49
Therefore, while it is conceivable that
states might agree to some internation-
al regulations (for example, no sale of
high-resolution imagery to active com-
batants), there is little reason to believe
that they would jeopardize the future
of their commercial satellite industries
by operating within a framework that
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clearly favors U.S. and Israeli political
and economic interests. 
The prospect of controlling access to
sensitive high-resolution satellite
imagery through bilateral or multilater-
al agreements becomes even more
dubious as remote sensing technology
proliferates further. As mentioned,
Canada, France, India, and Russia are
already providing high-resolution opti-
cal and radar imagery to consumers
worldwide. Over the next five to ten
years, at least eight more countries
(Argentina, Brazil, China, Israel, Japan,
Pakistan, South Korea, and Taiwan) are
planning to enter the market. Even if
the United States can convince existing
imagery providers to restrict access to
their high-resolution imagery, which
seems extremely doubtful, there is no
reason to believe that the emerging
satellite operators would respect U.S.
wishes on what should be disseminat-
ed or to whom. 
shutter control
by other means
In the long run, if it proves unworkable
to control the flow of information from
satellites either unilaterally or by agree-
ment with other countries, two options
remain: take direct action to prevent the
satellites from seeing what they would
otherwise see, or learn to live with the
new transparency. 
Direct action requires states either to
hide what is on the ground or to disable
satellites in the sky. Satellites generally
travel in fixed orbits, so that it is easy to
predict when one will be overhead and
take concealment measures. Hiding
assets from satellite observation is an
old cold war trick. The Soviets used to
deploy large numbers of fake tanks and
even ships. Sensitive objects can be cov-
ered with conductive material such as
chicken wire screening to create a
reflective glare that obscures the details
of whatever is underneath. Indeed, one
concern for the United States is
whether countries that currently do not
bother trying to conceal their activities
from U.S. spy satellites will institute
concealment measures once they
become aware that commercial opera-
tors may sell imagery of them to
regional adversaries. In other words,
the advent of commercial high-resolu-
tion satellite imagery may cause the
United States to lose access to informa-
tion it currently has.
At the same time, although conceal-
ment is often possible, it will become
harder as the number of eyes in the sky
proliferates. The advent of high-resolu-
tion radar technology, capable of
detecting objects day or night, in any
weather and through clouds or smoke,
will further reduce the windows in
which states can carry out sensitive
activities unobserved. Moreover, many
of the new systems have the ability to
look from side to side as well as straight
down, so that knowing when you are
being observed is not so easy.
If hiding does not work, are counter-
measures against a satellite possible?
There are many ways to put satellites
out of commission, especially unpro-
tected civilian systems that are of
necessity in low earth orbits.50
Electronic and electro-optical counter-
measures can be used to jam or deceive
satellites. Satellites can also be
spoofedÑinterfered with electronically
and made to shut down or change
orbit. The operator may never know
whether the malfunction is merely a
technical glitch or the result of a hostile
action.51 (And the spoofer may never
know whether the target satellite was
successfully affected.) Such counter-
measures could prove very useful
during crises or war to prevent access
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to imagery of a specific, temporary
activity without the legal bother of
shutter control or the political hassle of
negotiated restraints. During peace-
time, they would become rather obvi-
ous if carried out on a routine basis to
prevent imaging of a particular site. 
The more dramatic approach would
be either to shoot the satellites down or
destroy data-receiving stations on the
ground. Short of imminent or actual
war, it is unthinkable that any country
would bring international opprobrium
on itself by destroying civilian satellites
or committing acts of aggression
against the territory of a sovereign
state. Given that the more powerful
nations of the world will be developing
and operating most commercial satel-
lites, it would be a self-defeating strate-
gy for other, generally weaker, states to
take direct action against these systems.
The costs of such a strategy would far
outweigh any potential gains.
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international law and remote sensing of earth
Despite burgeoning interest in civilian and commercial land observation satellites, few
internationally recognized and legally binding principles regulate remote sensing activi-
ties. Existing standards, the result largely of longstanding U.S. efforts to render legitimate
both military reconnaissance and civilian imaging from space, are codified in two UN
documents. The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
declares that Ò[o]uter space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject
to national appropriation by claim of sovereigntyÓ1 and Òshall be free for exploration and
use by all states.Ó2 States cannot exert control over any part of outer space in the same way
they do airspace above their national territories, so satellites are free to orbit over them.
The treaty stipulates, however, that exploration and use of outer space are to be carried
out for peaceful purposes and in a manner that benefits all countries of the world.3 It also
requires that Òstate parties to the treaty shall bear international responsibility for national
activities in outer spaceÉwhether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies
or by nongovernmental entities.Ó4
The UN General Assembly adopted a second document, Principles Relating to Remote
Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space, on December 3, 1986. Acceptance of the principles
in this document followed intense disagreement between the developed countries, led by
the United States, and the developing nations, led by the former Soviet Union. The U.S.
camp maintained that collection and distribution of civilian remote sensing imagery
should flourish unrestricted. The Soviet camp argued that the acquisition and dissemina-
tion of such imagery should only be allowed with the consent of the state that is over-
flown. The 1986 UN Principles were a clear victory for the U.S. position. Instead of
endorsing the right of prior consent, Principle XII of the document merely required that
Ò[a]s soon as the primary data and the processed data concerning the territory under its
jurisdiction are produced, the sensed state shall have access to them on a non-discrimina-
tory basis and on reasonable cost terms.Ó5 The principles did not specify whether a request
from the sensed stateÕs government triggers the obligation to make the data available, or
whether satellite operators have a responsibility to inform the sensed state that imagery of
its territory is available. This lack of precision has allowed satellite operators to interpret
the regulations in a manner that is most convenient to them. At present, Principle XII of
the 1986 UN document is interpreted to mean that only if a country being imaged knows
that it is being imaged and asks for a copy is it entitled to one at the market rate. Even
then, it will not know who requested specific images or for what purposes.
Whether the rather lackadaisical regulations of remote sensing activities embodied in the
1967 Outer Space Treaty and the 1986 Legal Principles will continue to satisfy govern-
ments whose territories are routinely being observed by large numbers of increasingly
sophisticated commercial satellites remains to be seen. It is quite possible that as the num-
ber of eyes in the sky increases, so will the demands of governments seeking greater pro-
tection for their territorial sovereignty.
1Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Article II, United Nations, New York, January 27, 1967.
2Ibid., Article I.
3Ibid., Articles I and IV.
4Ibid., Article VI.
5ÒPrinciples Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space,Ó Principle XII, United Nations General
Assembly, New York, December 3, 1986.
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This telephone has too many short-
comings to be seriously considered as
a means of communication. The device
is inherently of no value to us.
ÑWestern Union 
internal memo, 1876
Heavier-than-air flying machines are
impossible.
ÑLord Kelvin, president, 
Royal Society, 1895
The wireless music box has no imaginable
commercial value. Who would pay for a
message sent to nobody in particular?
ÑDavid SarnoffÕs associates 
in response to his urgings for 
investment in the radio in the 1920s
I think there is a world market for
maybe five computers.
ÑThomas Watson, chairman ,
International Business 
Machines (IBM), 1943
There is no reason anyone would
want a computer in their home.
ÑKen Olson, president 
and founder, Digital 
Equipment Corporation, 1977
640K ought to be enough for anybody.
ÑBill Gates, Microsoft Corporation, 1981
The success rate of prognostications about
how new technologies will fare approach-
es zero. No one really knows whether a
thriving satellite commercial remote sens-
ing industry will develop over the next
decade, or whether the whole industry
will crash, figuratively if not literally.
The only sure prediction is that the
industry will change, drastically, in the
next few years. Some of those changes
may come in the form of technological
improvements. Space Imaging, operator
of the IKONOS satellite now in orbit,
recently announced that it is thinking
about follow-ons with even greater
capabilities. Chief Executive Officer
John Copple noted in an interview that
the market has changed notably in the
four years since the company was
formed. Not only is there competition
from other potential satellite operators,
but ÒweÕre seeing much higher resolu-
tion from the aerial companies and
would like to be able to participate in
that market.Ó52 Although there is a wide-
spread myth that Presidential Decision
Directive-23 limits the resolution of
American satellites to no better than 1
meter, in fact there is no constraint on
resolution. Indeed, under ideal condi-
tions IKONOS and some of the other
satellites scheduled for launch within
the next year will achieve resolutions
closer to 0.86 meter. Copple says that the
U.S. national security industry, likely to
be a major customer, is urging U.S. com-
panies to move to higher resolutions in
future satellites.53
Some of the changes may involve the
organization of the industry. Spot
Image of France and OrbImage of the
United States recently announced plans
for a partnership that would market
OrbImageÕs high-resolution imagery
(from OrbView 3 and OrbView 4,
planned for launch in late 2000)
through SpotÕs well-established global
sales network.54 Such cross-border
conclusion6
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alliances are becoming emblematic of
the globalization of the industry. Not
only are there many countries with
civilian or commercial operators, the
operators themselves are increasingly
multinational enterprises.
If commercial satellite remote sensing
does take off, the new availability of
imagery will raise further questions for
government officials and others around
the world, questions not easily answered
through purely national means. Because
information really is power, the spread
of this particularly vivid and compre-
hensive form of information will ripple
through all sorts of relationshipsÑthose
among states, and those between states
and other international actors such as
businesses and civil society.
The rapidly growing literature and
plethora of conferences on the new
satellites have mostly focused on what
the availability of high-resolution
imagery will do to the conduct of war,
and in particular whether it will under-
mine the overwhelming military pre-
ponderance of the United States.
Certainly it is possible to imagine cir-
cumstances in which the United States
would benefit militarily from the sup-
pression of such imagery. It is more dif-
ficult to imagine military conflicts
involving the United States in which
France, India, Israel, Russia, and even-
tually China would all agree to go
along with the suppression of such
imagery. This battle is already lost.
The more fundamental questions
raised by the new satellites have to do
with basic issues about the meaning
and relevance of national borders,
about the relationships of governments
not only to one another but also to pri-
vate businesses and nongovernmental
organizations, and about the meaning
of national sovereignty. Satellite
imagery is only one of a whole series of
information technologies that have
caused states to lose control over infor-
mation about what is happening within
their borders. From now on, it will not
only be the U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations who can show images
of atrocities in the UN Security Council
and demand action. Any government
on the council will be able to do so, or
any government or nongovernmental
organization that can persuade a coun-
cil member to present the images.
International negotiations on every-
thing from arms control to climate
change, already populated by ever-
growing numbers of governments,
businesses, and nongovernmental
organizations, will face new complica-
tions caused by their inability to sup-
press or ignore unwanted information.
Because information will be so widely
available, crises may become harder to
manage, as leaders find themselves
under relentless pressure to act quickly.
But this is not the first time the world
has had to adjust to a technologically
driven jump in the availability of infor-
mation. Printing presses were once
seen as tools of the devil because they
removed control over information from
the hands of the medieval Catholic
Church and spread it across the (liter-
ate) populace at large. Every new step
from the telegraph to the Internet has
been greeted with proclamations of
apocalyptic change. Governments that
have tried to suppress and control
flows of information have, in the long
run, suffered for it. The wiser course of
action, as well as the only practicable
one, is to learn to live with the new
transparency.
For the United States in particular, it
is most unlikely that the shortsighted
policy of shutter control will do good,
and it could do harm even to the
United States itself by undermining an
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industry on which the national security
community will increasingly have to
rely. The United States would be better
served by policies that return to the tra-
ditional U.S. emphasis on open skies
and freedom of information. In the
1960s, U.S. policies helped bring about
the legitimacy of satellite reconnais-
sance. In the 1970s and 1980s, U.S. lead-
ership in both the technology and poli-
tics of civilian remote sensing led to
global acceptance of unconstrained
imaging from space. When the
inevitable international disputes arise
over the new transparency, and when
the United States finds itself facing
short-term interests in suppressing
imagery, it is crucial that it stick to the
long-range policies in favor of trans-
parency that have served it so well.
For the rest of the world, this new
form of transparency will do far more
good than harm. Countries that now
live in fear of one another will be able
to learn whether those potentially hos-
tile neighbors are in fact mobilizing for
attack, and would-be attackers, at least
sometimes, will be deterred by the over-
whelming likelihood of detection. The
pressing environmental and develop-
mental problems facing poor countries,
heretofore unseen and therefore easily
ignored by the rich, will become both
more visible and better understood.
Most important, the new imagery
will contribute to a badly needed shift
in perspective. As Oliver Morton wrote
in an article on satellite imagery in
Wired magazine in 1997:
Like the telephone or the wrist watch, it
is the sort of product that gets woven
into the fabric of lifeÑin this case, as an
assumption that all the world is out
there to be seen, that it is all available,
comprehensible, and held in com-
monÉ. With shared eyes we will watch
the world carry its cargo of civiliza-
tionÑits roads, its fields, its cities, its
landfillsÑthrough time and space. This
portrait will be an image that can zoom
in to the personal and pull out to the
geopolitical, a new way to look at bor-
ders, a new way to look at news. It will
be an illustration of everything: not, in
the end, a view from nowhere, but a
view from everywhere, for everyone.55
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appendix a: selected commercial 
and civilian imaging satellites
north america
Launch
(end of service) Operator
Capability
(meters)
Swath Width
(kilometers)
Revisit Time
(days)Satellite
Landsat 3
Landsat 4
Landsat 5
Landsat 6
Landsat 7
IKONOS 1
IKONOS 2
EarlyBird
QuickBird 1
QuickBird 2
OrbView 3
OrbView4
NEMO
Resource21
RADAR 1
RADARSAT-1
RADARSAT-2
Status
1978 (1983)
1982
1984
1993 (1993)
1999
1999 (1999)
1999
1997(1997)
2000
2000
2000
2000
2001
2001
2002
1995
2002
NASA/NOAA
EOSAT/Sp. Imaging
EOSAT/Sp. Imaging
EOSAT
USGS
Space Imaging
Space Imaging
Earth Watch
Earth Watch
Earth Watch
OrbImage
OrbImage
STDC
Boeing
RDL
CSA
MDA
30RVB/80MS
30MS/80MS
30MS/80MS
15PAN/30MS
15PAN/30MS
0.82-1PAN/4MS
0.82-1PAN/4MS
3PAN/15MS
1PAN/4MS
1PAN/4MS
4MS/8HS
1PAN/4MS/8HSb
5PAN/30HS
10PAN
1SAR
8SAR
3SAR
185/185
185/185
185/185
185/185
185/185
13/13
13/13
3/15
22/22
22/22
8/8
8/8/5
30/30
200
4
50-500
50-500
18
16
16
16
16
3 to 5
3 to 5
1 to 5
1 to 5
1 to 5
3
3
1 to 7
7
1
3 to 24
3 to 24
retired
operationala
operational
failed
operational
failed
operational
failed
planned
planned
planned
planned
planned
planned
planned
operational
planned
russia
Launch
(end of service) Operator
Capability
(meters)
Swath Width
(kilometers)
Revisit Time
(days)Satellite
SPIN-2a
RESURS-F
RESURS-DK
Status
Periodicb
Periodicc
2000
Russia
Russia
Russia
2PAN/10PAN
5-8MS/15-30MS
2PAN/3MS/3SAR
180/200
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
western europe
Launch
(end of service) Operator
Capability
(meters)
Swath Width
(kilometers)
Revisit Time
(days)Satellite
SPOT 1/2
SPOT 3
SPOT 4
SPOT 5
ERS-1
ERS-2
ENVISAT 1
ENVISAT 2
Status
1986/90
1993 (1996)
1998
2002
1991
1995
2000
2003
Spot Image
Spot Image
Spot Image
Spot Image
ESA
ESA
ESA
ESA
10PAN/20MS
10PAN/20MS
10PAN/20MS
2.5PAN/10MS
30-50 SAR
30-50 SAR
30 SAR
N/A
60/60
60/60
60/60
60/60
100-500
100-500
100
N/A
1 to 4
1 to 4
1 to 4
1 to 4
3 to 35
3 to 35
3 to 35
N/A
operationala
failed
operational
planned
operational
operational
planned
planning
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Launch
(end of service) Operator
Capability
(meters)
Swath Width
(kilometers)
Revisit Time
(days)Satellite
IRS-1C
IRS-1D
IRS-P5a
IRS-P6b
CartoSat-2
Badr-C
Status
1995
1997
2000
2001
2003
2000
India
India
India
India
India
Pakistan
5PAN/23MS
5PAN/23MS
2.5PAN
5PC/23MS
1PAN
10MS
70/150
70/150
30
750/750
N/A
205
5 to 24
5 to 24
5 to24
5-24
N/A
N/A
operational
operational
planned
planning
planning
planned
south asia
southeast asia and south america
Launch
(end of service) Operator
Capability
(meters)
Swath Width
(kilometers)
Revisit Time
(days)Satellite
JERS-1
ADEOS1
ALOS-1
Info-Collectic
Kompsat-1
Kompsat-2
Rocsat 2
CEMD
CBERS I
CBERS II
CBERS III
CBERS IV
SABIA
Status
1992 (1998)
1996 (1997)
2003
2003
1999
2003
2002
2003
1999
2001
N/A
N/A
2003
Japan
Japan
Japan
Japan
South Korea
South Korea
Taiwan
China
China/Brazil
China/Brazil
China/Brazil
China/Brazil
Brazil/Argentina
18MS/18SAR
8PAN/16MS
2.5PAN/10MS/10SAR
1PAN/3SAR
10PAN/20MS
1PAN/4MS
2PAN
4SAR
20MS/80-160MS
20MS/80-160MS
5PAN/10MS
5PAN/10MS
6MS
75/75
80/80
70/70/70
N/A
40/40
N/A
N/A
700
120/120
120/120
N/A
N/A
400
44
41
46
N/A
2 to 3
2 to 3
1
N/A
26
26
N/A
N/A
N/A
retired
failed
planned
planning
operational
planned
planning
operational
planned
planning
planning
planning
australia
Launch
(end of service) Operator
Capability
(meters)
Swath Width
(kilometers)
Revisit Time
(days)Satellite
Aries
Status
2003 Australia 10PAN/30HS 15/15 6 to 7 planned
middle east
Launch
(end of service) Operator
Capability
(meters)
Swath Width
(kilometers)
Revisit Time
(days)Satellite
EROS-A1
EROS-A2
EROS-B1
Status
2000
2000
2001
WIS
WIS
WIS
1.8PAN
1.8PAN
0.8PAN
13
13
13
2 to 3
2 to 3
2 to 3
planned
planned
planned
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appendix b: policy history
In grappling with the policy implications of high-resolution satellite imagery, it is help-
ful to have a good understanding of how current policies came about. Because civilian
remote sensing has been so heavily dominated by the United States until quite recent-
ly, in both technological and policy terms, much of the history occurred there.
The history begins with the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), which developed the first civilian remote sensing satellite, Landsat. The
launch of Landsat 1 in 1972 gave the global public its first glimpse of satellite images
of Earth. However, Landsat 1Õs relatively low resolution (80 meters multispectral) was
too coarse for most commercial purposes. During these early years research scientists,
educators, and government agencies were the principal users of Landsat imagery. 
To expand the user base for Landsat data and set the stage for the eventual com-
mercialization of the civilian remote sensing industry, the Carter administration
issued Presidential Decision Directive-54 in July 1979. The directive transferred the
operation of the Landsat systems to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) in the U.S. Department of Commerce and directed NOAA
to Òseek ways to further private sector opportunities in civil land remote sensing
activities É with the goal of eventual operations of these activities by the private
sector.Ó1 The administration hoped that under NOAA the management cost of the
Landsat program would decline significantly, improving the prospects for its even-
tual commercialization. Moreover, it was believed that the future availability of 30-
meter resolution imagery from Landsats 4 and 5 (planned for launch within the
next five years) would dramatically increase the revenue earned from the sale of
Landsat imagery.2 These two factors, it was reasoned, would ultimately lead to the
creation of an affordable and robust market for remote sensing data. That market in
turn would encourage the growth of a commercial satellite industry that could
develop and operate remote sensing systems for government and private markets.3
the unpromising start of commercialization
Following the election of President Ronald Reagan in 1980, the government aban-
doned the Carter administrationÕs gradual approach to commercialization of the
Landsat program in favor of a far more accelerated plan. To cut federal spending by
privatizing government programs, the Reagan administration ignored evidence
that suggested that the remote sensing market was not sufficiently mature to sus-
tain an independent commercial industry. That evidence included four feasibility
studies commissioned by the U.S. government between 1982 and 1983. The first,
undertaken by the Civil Operational Remote Sensing Satellite Advisory Committee
of the Department of Commerce, found that the commercial market for Landsat
data was seriously underdeveloped and recommended that Òcommercialization of
the Landsat program should be done gradually.Ó4
The other three studies supported the committeeÕs conclusions. Following an in-
depth analysis of the satellite imagery market, ECON Incorporated concluded that
Òfull transfer of the civil land remote sensing system to the private sector, with the
expectation of a viable self-sustaining enterprise, is premature.Ó5 Similarly, Earth
Satellite Corporation declared that ÒNo option was found that would permit the
[Landsat] program to be commercialized, today or in the near future, without sub-
stantial subsidies or government-guaranteed data purchases.Ó6 Using a much
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harsher tone, the National Academy of Public Administration argued that the
Reagan administrationÕs decision to transfer operations of the Landsat program to
the private sector Òfails to meet sensible criteria of preservation of the national secu-
rityÓ and represents a Òforced premature privatization of these responsibilities.Ó7
Despite these cautionary words, the Reagan administration pressed ahead.
Faced with the likelihood that funding for the Landsat program would soon be
discontinued, Congress quickly approved the Land Remote Sensing
Commercialization Act (P.L. 98-365), which was signed into law on July 17, 1984.
The act directed the secretary of commerce to select a contractor to operate the
Landsat system; instructed system operators to market the resulting data on a
nondiscriminatory basis; required the Department of Commerce to maintain an
archive of land remote sensing data for historical, scientific, and technical purpos-
es; and established a licensing and oversight process for new entrants into the
anticipated private remote sensing industry. 
In September 1985, NOAA selected the Earth Observation Satellite Company
(EOSAT), a joint venture of RCA Corporation and Hughes Aircraft Company, to
operate the Landsat satellites and market the resulting data for a period of ten
years. According to the terms of the contract, the U.S. government would continue
to cover the operational costs of the Landsat program through the three-year
expected lifetime of Landsats 4 and 5. In addition, because the market for remote
sensing data was considered underdeveloped, the U.S. government agreed to sub-
sidize EOSAT in the amount of $295 million over a five-year period to develop and
launch two new Landsat spacecraft, Landsats 6 and 7. Upon the launch of Landsat
6, EOSAT would assume full responsibility for all operational costs of the Landsat
program. Policy makers and EOSAT executives believedÑor hopedÑthat during
the lifetime of Landsats 6 and 7, EOSATÕs revenues would grow sufficiently to
allow the company to finance the development, launch, and operation of future
land remote sensing systems.8
The government transferred responsibility for the operation of the Landsat pro-
gram to EOSAT in October 1985. It then failed to keep its end of the bargain. The
Reagan administration deleted additional subsidies for EOSAT from its FY1987
budget proposal, arguing that the remaining $125 million called for in the EOSAT-
NOAA contract would have to come from EOSAT or other private sources. In
December 1986, EOSAT began laying off employees and ceased all marketing and
spacecraft development. Congress again intervened to ensure the survival of the
Landsat program beyond Landsat 5: in FY1987 it appropriated $62.5 million to con-
tinue the development of Landsat 6. However, the funds could not be released until
NOAA drafted and Congress approved a new Landsat commercialization plan. 
In June 1987 NOAA submitted its new commercialization proposal to Congress.
It called for EOSAT to develop only one additional Landsat satellite, and funds
were provided for a feasibility study for a second satellite that might include more
advanced and commercially oriented sensors. Congress initially rejected the pro-
posal but acquiesced in October 1987. 
Between November 1987 and April 1988, NOAA renegotiated its contract with
EOSAT. The revised contract directed EOSAT to develop Landsat 6 and all associ-
ated ground systems. The government agreed to subsidize the project up to $220
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million; EOSAT was to absorb any additional costs. Under an innovative ÒpaybackÓ
arrangement, EOSAT agreed to refund $10.8 million to the government over a peri-
od of approximately four years. In addition, EOSAT waived all rights to data from
follow-on civil remote sensing spacecraft beyond Landsat 6. With this agreement in
place, Congress finally released the $62.5 million appropriated for the development
of Landsat 6 in the FY1987 budget.
No sooner was the Landsat 6 dilemma resolved than the Landsat program faced yet
another crisis. The 1984 Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act had instructed
NOAA to finance the operations of Landsats 4 and 5 through the expected lifetime of
the two satellites, which was projected for 1987, and the support was due to expire at
the end of that year. NOAA, which had no particular institutional interest in continu-
ing the Landsat program, made no arrangements to fund either satellite after the expi-
ration date, regardless of whether the satellites were still operational. Thus NOAA did
not request any funds for the Landsat program in its FY1989 budget even though the
satellites were still functioning. Congress quickly appropriated $9.4 million to fund
Landsats 4 and 5 for the first half of the fiscal year and asked NOAA to secure fund-
ing for the second half. Unable to obtain sufficient funds, NOAA directed EOSAT to
turn the satellites off in April 1989. This proposal drew strong protests from Congress,
foreign governments, and data users in the United States and around the world. In
response to the outcry, the National Space Council, chaired by Vice President Dan
Quayle in the Bush administration, drafted an interim funding plan that asked gov-
ernment agencies that used Landsat imagery to provide money to NOAA. Moreover,
the council recommended that the federal government ensure the operation of
Landsats 4 and 5 so long as the satellites were the only source of civilian remote sens-
ing data.9 NOAA rescinded the shutdown order in March 1989.
The same routine played out during fiscal years 1990 and 1991. In both years
Congress provided $9.5 million for the first six months of the each year and asked
other government agencies that used Landsat imagery to provided the remaining
funds. Finally, on June 1, 1989, President George Bush Òapproved funding for con-
tinued operations of Landsat satellites 4 and 5 and for the completion and launch
of Landsat 6.Ó10 In addition, President Bush Òdirected the National Space Council
and the Office of Management and Budget to review options with the intention of
continuing Landsat-type data collections after Landsat 6.Ó11
the undoing of landsat commercialization
By the early 1990s, several developments made it clear that the U.S. government
needed to review the Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984. First,
the forced commercialization of the Landsat program had faltered badly. Instead of
spending $295 million to acquire and deploy two Landsat satellites, the U.S. gov-
ernment had committed itself to spending $245.7 million to develop and launch
only one. Moreover, commercialization of Landsat had dramatically increased the
price of imagery. Between 1982 and 1985, the prices of data from LandsatÕs multi-
spectral scanner and thematic mapper instruments more than doubled.12 The hike
in prices led many of the former customers of Landsat imagery, including large
numbers of scientists and academics, to stop using Landsat products. 
Second, the emergence of foreign competitors to Landsat imagery eliminated the
United StatesÕ comfortable position as the sole provider of remote sensing data.
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Following the successful launch of the French SPOT-1 satellite in February 1986,
Spot Image began marketing 10-meter panchromatic and 20-meter multispectral
images of the Earth. A year later a Soviet firm, Soyzkarta, initiated limited sale of 5-
meter panchromatic photographs from its Cosmos KFA-1000, MK-4, and MFK-6
cameras.13 These developments led many in the United States to worry that foreign
companies might come to dominate the remote sensing market. This concern
gained new urgency as SPOTÕs sale of remote sensing imagery surpassed that of
EOSAT by 1989.14 Many within and outside the U.S. government began to question
the wisdom of a policy that allowed foreign countries to surpass the United States
in an industry it had pioneered.
Third, Landsat imagery proved remarkably useful during the planning and exe-
cution of the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War. As D. Brian Gordon of the Defense
Intelligence Agency testified, ÒThere were significant contributions by Landsat É
to the success of Operation Desert Storm.Ó15 According to some estimates, the U.S.
Department of Defense spent $5 to $6 million on Landsat imagery during the Gulf
War.16 Throughout the conflict, allied forces used Landsat imagery for terrain analy-
sis, operational planning, and concealment detection.17
All these pressures led the U.S. Congress to pass the Land Remote Sensing Policy
Act (P.L. 102-555), which was signed into law by President George Bush on October
28, 1992. The act recognized that Òthe continuous collection and utilization of land
remote sensing data from space are of major benefit in studying and understanding
human impacts on the global environment, in managing the EarthÕs natural
resources, in carrying out national security functions, and in planning and con-
ducting many other activities of scientific, economic, and social importance.Ó18 The
act further acknowledged that Òdespite the success and importance of the Landsat
system, funding and organizational uncertainties over the past several years have
placed its future in doubt and have jeopardized United States leadership in land
remote sensing.Ó19 The act rejected full commercialization of the Landsat program
Òwithin the foreseeable futureÓ20 and transferred control of the Landsat system to
NASA and the DOD. Authority for licensing any new private remote sensing satel-
lites remained with the secretary of commerce, as it had been under the 1984 act,
with advisory roles given to the secretaries of state and defense. The act repealed
the obligation established by the earlier act that compelled private companies to
make all raw data available to all potential users at the same cost and terms.
Instead, the new law merely required that satellite operators Òmake available to the
government of any country (including the United States) unenhanced data collect-
ed by the system concerning the territory under the jurisdiction of such government
as soon as such data are available and on reasonable terms and conditions.Ó21
Shortly after passage of the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act, disagreements arose
between NASA and the DOD over what type of sensors to place on the Landsat 7
satellite. NASA favored the cheaper Enhanced Thematic Mapper Plus, capable of
acquiring 15-meter images of Earth. The DOD pushed for the new High Resolution
Multispectral Stereo Imager sensor, which could collect 5-meter resolution data of
particular interest to it.
The disagreement had not been resolved when disaster struck. At approximately
11:08 a.m. Pacific Standard Time on October 5, 1993, nearly 13 minutes after the
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launch of Landsat 6, a ruptured hydrazine manifold prevented fuel from reaching
the satellite engine, and the $256.5 million spacecraft plunged into the Pacific
Ocean.22 Following the failure of Landsat 6 to reach orbit, NASA concluded that the
high cost of developing the High Resolution Multispectral Stereo Imager sensor
could undermine the timely development and deployment of Landsat 7. It there-
fore rejected placement of the sensor on board the new Landsat satellite.
Consequently, the DOD pulled out of the Landsat program. 
With the DOD out, the question of which agency or agencies should develop and
operate the Landsat system and market the resulting data once again came to the
forefront. The White House finally resolved the issue in Presidential Decision
Directive-3 of May 10, 1994: NASA would be responsible for developing and
launching Landsat 7, NOAA would operate the spacecraft and all relevant ground
systems, and the Department of the Interior would archive and distribute the data
at the marginal cost of reproduction. 
As this monograph went to press, yet another rearrangement of responsibilities for
the Landsat program was underway. A new Presidential Decision Directive was
drafted that would transfer all operational responsibility for the Landsat 7 program
from NOAA to the Department of the InteriorÕs U.S. Geological Survey (USGS).
Given that USGS had a more obvious interest in pursuing land remote sensing activ-
ities than NOAA, the transfer was expected to be approved in the very near future.
With the successful launch of Landsat 7 on April 15, 1999, the United States came
full circle, restoring a significant government subsidy to civilian remote sensing,
although now with a substantially improved satellite. Landsat 7 is providing 15-
meter panchromatic and 30-meter multispectral images of Earth and is expected to
continue functioning until 2004. It has the ability to re-image areas of interest every
16 days with its more accurate Enhanced Thematic Mapper Plus sensor. More
important, Landsat 7 images are available to all consumers of satellite imagery Òat
the cost of fulfilling user requests,Ó23 and anyone who buys an image is free to pass
it on at no extra charge. As of the end of 1999, prices were $475 per scene for mini-
mally processed data and $600 per scene for radiometrically and geometrically cor-
rected data (over 50 percent cheaper than any comparable commercially available
civilian or private satellite imagery).24
Although it might seem that the government is subsidizing a competitor to com-
mercial operators, the Landsat 7 sensors are sufficiently different from the com-
mercial sensors that direct competition is unlikely. Indeed, by helping build a mar-
ket for satellite imagery in general, the Landsat program may in fact help the com-
mercial prospects of private satellite operators.
The Landsat story nonetheless raises important red flags. The commercial success of
the satellite remote sensing industry is by no means assured. Nations that try to pri-
vatize their government-controlled civilian systems may find themselves with neither
a civilian nor a commercial system, as the United States almost did in the early 1990s. 
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